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Abstract
Since the last 30 years, the economy has been undergoing a massive digital transformation.
Intangible digital assets, like software solutions, web services, and more recently deep learn-
ing algorithms, artificial intelligence and digital platforms, have been increasingly adopted
thanks to the diffusion and advancements of information and communication technologies.
Various observers argue that we could rapidly approach a technological singularity leading
to explosive economic growth. This research work as a whole is aimed at investigating
potential consequences on our economy deriving from digital technological progress. In
particular, the contribution of the thesis is both empirical, theoretical and related to model
design. On the empirical side, I present a cross-country empirical analysis assessing the
correlation between the growth rate of both tangible and intangible investments and different
measures of productivity growth. The analysis results are used to inform the first of the two
frameworks of the agent-based macro-model Eurace that I employ to assess the long-term
impact of digital investments on economy. In particular, in the first framework, a total factor
augmenting approach has been used in order to model the digital technological progress
because of the significant and positive correlation between total factor productivity and ICT
capital investments, composed by a combination of both tangible and intangible investments
which includes ICT technologies, software and database. In the second framework, I propose
a different and innovative approach in which digital technological progress influences the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. In this way, an increase of the elasticity
of substitution can be seen as an increase in the tasks that machines can perform replacing
human beings. In order to develop this approach, I substitute the Cobb-Douglas production
function used in the first framework with a Leontief technology in which input factors
are represented by organizational units. In turn, the contribution of each unit is given by
a combination of capital and labour. The second framework results to be more realistic
because it allows to distinguish between the various activities performed in the companies
and the different education levels characterizing the workforce employed. Computational
experiments show the emergence of technological unemployment in the long-run with a high
pace of intangible digital investments. However, in the elasticity augmenting framework
compensation mechanisms work more effectively leading to lower unemployment levels
v
compared to the total factor augmenting one. Both frameworks are able to capture interesting
features and empirical evidences characterizing our economic system.
Table of contents
1 Digital Transformation: an overview 1
1.1 Digital intangible assets: a literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Productivity and digital assets: an empirical assessment . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Digital technological progress and its potential consequences on labour market 11
2 Modelling the Digital Transformation: the Total Factor Augmenting Approach
in Eurace 15
2.1 Literature overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 The added value of agent based modelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 The Eurace model with intangible digital assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.1 Software tools and computational framework . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.2 Outline of the baseline Eurace model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.3 Eurace: a stock-flow-consistent model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.4 Supply side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.5 Demand side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3.6 Digital asset price dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.3.7 Employees’ digital technologies skills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4 Computational results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4.1 Design of experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4.2 “Competitive pricing" and “collusive pricing" business dynamics
analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.4.3 Competitiveness in the "competitive pricing" case . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.4.4 The digital economy from a macroeconomic perspective . . . . . . 41
2.4.5 The “competitive pricing" case: a deeper investigation . . . . . . . 42
3 Modelling the Digital Transformation: the Elasticity Augmenting Approach 47
3.1 The elasticity augmenting framework: a short introduction . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2 The new production technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Table of contents vii
3.2.1 Integrating the new production technology in the Eurace model . . 50
3.3 Computational results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3.1 Design of experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3.2 The dynamics of the system: a macroeconomic perspective . . . . . 53
3.3.3 The competitive dynamics between DADs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3.4 Elasticity augmenting approach and total factor augmenting ap-




Digital Transformation: an overview
1.1 Digital intangible assets: a literature review
In his 1930 lecture “Economic possibilities for our grandchildren”, John Maynard Keynes
predicted that in one hundred years from then, i.e. around 2030, the production problem
would be solved and there would be enough for everyone but machines would cause “tech-
nological unemployment”. McKinsey Global Institute in a recent report1 stated that the
increasing adoption of automation technologies, including artificial intelligence and robotics,
will generate significant benefits for the economy, raising productivity and economic growth,
but with a far-reaching impact on the global workforce. In particular, according to the
study, around half of current work activities are subject to be technically automatable by
adapting current available technologies and, by 2030, 75 million to 375 million workers will
be displaced by automation with the need to change occupation to avoid unemployment.
Brian Arthur, one of the pioneers in studying the economics of the digital age, recently
stated2 that we have reached or are close to the above-mentioned “Keynes point”, i.e. a new
economic era where we are witnessing the “third morphing” of the digital revolution. In
particular, while the first morphing in the 70s/80s was characterized by the microchip and the
availability of cheap digital calculus, the second morphing in the 90s/00s by the widespread
diffusion of computer networks, the third morphing is bringing intelligent machines. The
combination of computers, sensors, big data and statistical learning techniques, provides
machines characterized by the sort of associative intelligence typical of biological beings,
then potentially able to substitute humans in a large set of activities.
1McKinsey Global Institute, Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained: Workforce Transitions in a Time of Automation,
December 2017.
2Arthur (2017) Where is technology taking the economy. McKinsey Quarterly
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In this respect, the higher efficiency related to the introduction of new digital technologies
generally determines a higher productivity which in turn can lead to lower employment, see
Pianta (2009). Furthermore, it is worth noting that while most of innovations introduced in
the production process until the end of the XX century empowered workers with additional
mechanical energy able to overcome the limits imposed by human physical force, “The Sec-
ond Machine Age" (Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014)) characterized by robotics, automation,
software and artificial intelligence (AI) might be able to surmount also the limits imposed by
human mind. Technological unemployment is then becoming the concern not only of “blue
collars" but also of “white collars" workers. However, empirical studies have shown a job
polarization not completely consistent with the so-called “skill-biased technical change", see
Autor and Dorn (2013); Goos and Manning (2007); Goos et al. (2014). Indeed, the advent of
new digital technologies has led to a decreasing demand of mid-range workers performing
routine manual and cognitive tasks and, at the same time, to an increasing demand of high
salary non-routine cognitive jobs and low salary non-routine manual jobs.
The key element of intelligent machines is software, i.e. the collection and combination
of procedures, instructions and algorithms that set machines and computers behaviour based
on environment and input. Software is an intangible good which is non-rivalrous since it
is characterized by zero (or quasi zero) marginal costs. Arthur has investigated since the
80s the economic features of software and generally of intangible digital technologies as
well as their effects for business and the economy as whole, see Arthur (1989, 1990, 1994,
1996). In particular, he pointed out the existence of two different economic realities: the
so-called diminishing and increasing returns world. The former is represented by traditional
mass-production systems whose products require a huge amount of resources and a relatively
lower contribution of knowledge, whereas the latter is represented by high-tech companies
such as digital technologies producers: their products are characterized by a high knowledge
content and a scarce quantity of resources. Several economic features distinguish increasing
returns business worlds from traditional bulk-production worlds. Arthur mentions network
effects, positive feedback, path dependence, winner-takes-most/-takes-all outcomes, and then
technological lock-in. In particular, positive feedbacks reinforce market position of growing
companies and, at the same time, negatively affect producers with declining market share.
In the age of intelligent machines and digital automation, software, databases, artificial
intelligence algorithms, and any other sort of intangible digital technologies are playing an
increasingly dominant role with a far-reaching impact on the working of our economies.
A recent popular book by Haskel and Westlake (2017) emphasizes the increasing weight
of intangible investments in the economy and analyses its consequences. In particular, the
authors point out the four main features that characterize intangible goods, the so-called four
1.1 Digital intangible assets: a literature review 3
“S": scalability, sunk costs, spillovers, synergies. Scalability is related to the non-rivalrous
property of intangible goods and their zero (or quasi zero) marginal costs, see also Rifkin
(2014). Usually, firms producing this type of goods face high fixed costs, generally given by
research and/or development costs, compared to their variable production costs. Furthermore,
most of times, intangible investments represent sunk costs. A typical example is made by
software realized for specific firms and purposes; although this software represents an asset
for them, in case of exit from the market, it is very difficult to recover the initial investment.
Intangible investments tend to generate spillover since it may be difficult or expensive to
protect new knowledge generation and other companies can benefit copying or imitating
new ideas. Finally, the combination of different intangible assets together (or with hardware)
spurs innovations, e.g. at organizational level, that can increase companies’ profitability.
In other words, synergies create value for firms and, in the “intangible economy", the
willingness to increase their revenues have led to the so-called “open innovation". This fact
assumes a crucial importance because, from a wider perspective, the nature of technological
innovation and progress can be interpreted as based on synergies between different and
existing technologies, as argued by Arthur (2009).
It is worth noting that non-rivalrous digital assets do not cover all intangible invest-
ments, which include also other relevant assets, like patents, organizational innovations, or
investments in marketing and brand. However, in the era of intelligent machines and digital
automation, software, databases and artificial intelligence algorithms clearly deserve the
highest attention among the different kinds of intangible investments.
The increasing importance of digital technologies is also shown by digital platforms, like
Amazon, Deliveroo, Glovo, Foodora and Uber, which are typical examples of non rivalrous
services that have considerably affected our economic system both from employment and
working condition perspective, see Kenney and Zysman (2019). The so-called “digital
taylorism" has emerged, where platforms’ algorithms are able to control, to evaluate and
to organize labour activities. Moreover, as in the case of Foodora or Uber, some authors
argue that entrepreneurial risk has been transferred from companies to workers, see Dosi and
Roventini (2019).
A considerable effort has been spent during years in order to asses the impact of intangible
assets on productivity both at a firm, industry and national level, see Corrado et al. (2016);
Hao and Van Ark (2009); Marrocu et al. (2011), respectively. In particular, a sizeable number
of researches using different estimation methods underline the positive effect that intangible
assets have on labour and total factor productivity growth, see Roth (2019).
Building on the pioneering insights of Arthur and on the recent contribution by Haskel and
Westlake (2017), the study presented in the next section enriches the previous empirical work
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on the relation between measures of productivity and intangible investments. In particular, I
consider a higher number of countries and different kinds of intangible investments, also in
combination with tangible investments in information and communication technologies.
The main purpose of this empirical analysis is to inform the design of the first framework
of the Eurace model used to investigate potential consequences deriving from the digital
technological progress. In particular, the study of the relations between different typologies
of investments and productivity turns out to be crucial in order to find an effective way to
model the effects of investments in digital technologies on the production processes.
Results show a significant correlation between intangible investments and both labor and
total factor productivity in the period after the 2008 financial crisis. Similarly, both measures
of productivity growth are correlated with a combination of both tangible and intangible
investments which includes information and communication technologies and software and
database. Empirical results presented in the next section have been reported in Bertani et al.
(2020b).
1.2 Productivity and digital assets: an empirical assess-
ment
Following the previous considerations about the digital transformation, the aim of this
section is to provide an empirical and quantitative evidence about the impact of intangible
investments on the economy, in particular on the productivity of production factors, i.e. labor
and capital, taken singularly and in combination. The investigation is based on a correlation
analysis between the growth rates of different measures of investments and productivity,
along the line of the analysis presented in the recent book by Haskel and Westlake (2017),
which I extend in many dimensions, in particular, in the number of variables considered,
in the number of countries and in the length of the time period examined. The results will
inform the development of the new modelling features introduced in the first framework of
the agent-based macro-model Eurace concerning digital technologies. This first framework,
used to address the impact of the digital transformation on the economy and in particular on
the level of unemployment, will be presented in Chapter 2.
The role of intangible investments in our economy is becoming increasingly important
over time. In fact, intangible investments have surpassed tangible ones in certain markets,
as for example in the United Kingdom (UK), see Goodridge et al. (2012). In addition to
software and databases (Soft&DB), other kinds of intangible investments are represented for
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example by investments in R&D, design and engineering, mineral exploration, brands and
advertising, see Corrado et al. (2005); Thum-Thysen et al. (2017).
As far as digital technologies are concerned, Fig. 1.1 shows several time series represent-
ing the ratio between intangible investments in software and database and gross value added
(GVA) for various countries. The ratio between investments in Soft&DB and GVA represents
a relative measure which allows to compare the entity of these intangible investments between
countries regardless of their size and GDP. In fact, although the bigger countries tend to
invest more in absolute terms, their relative data can be lower than in some smaller countries,
see the case of USA and Netherlands in Fig. 1.1(a). Except for Italy (IT) and Luxembourg
(LU), see Fig. 1.1(b) and (c) respectively, these investments increased between 1995 and
2016; in particular Netherlands (NL), France (FR) and Sweden (SW) have experienced the
hugest enhancement. This shows the growing importance that digital assets have in our
economic system.










































































































































Figure 1.1: The figure shows various time series representing the trend between 1995 (1997
only for USA) and 2016 of ratio between software and database intangible investments and
gross value added for several countries. Time series are author’ elaboration of EU-KLEMS
data (www.euklems.net) based on a Hodrick–Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter
equal to 10. HP filtering has been performed to dampen excessive fluctuations and highlight
the general trend. Time series are organized in sub-figure according to their values: in Fig. 1
(a) time series with highest values are displayed and in Fig. 1 (d) time series with lowest
ones; in Fig. 1 (b) and (c) time series with intermediate values are reported.
Along the line of Haskel and Westlake (2017), I have carried out a correlation analysis
in order to investigate the relation among different measures of productivity and types of
investment. My study takes into account a larger number of countries and it is focused on a
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longer time period of twenty-two years, from 1995 to 2016. I split this time span in a pre and
post crisis time period, i.e., from 1995 to 2007 and from 2008 to 2016. The fifteen countries
considered are: Italy (IT), Germany (DE), Netherlands (NL), United Kingdom (UK), United
States (USA), France (FR), Sweden (SW), Spain (ES), Denmark (DK), Portugal (PT), Austria
(AT), Finland (FI), Ireland (IE), Greece (GR) and Luxembourg (LU).
Moreover, while Haskel and Westlake (2017) productivity-investments correlation anal-
ysis focused mainly on total factor productivity (TFP), I extend the analysis to different
measures of productivity, namely labour productivity (PL) and capital productivity (PK)3. As
for investments, I consider the following investment items:
• Total intangible investments (Tot Int): they represent the sum of R&D, software,
databases, mineral exploration and artistic originals investments;
• Intangible investments in software and database (Int Soft&DB);
• Intangible investments in R&D (Int R&D);
• Total tangible investments (Tot Tang): they represent the sum of ICT equipment,
transportation equipment, cultivated assets, non-residential structures, other machinery
equipment and weapons investments. I do not consider investments in residential
structures because the research focuses on those investments that generate productive
assets.
• Tangible investments in ICT equipment (Tang ICT).
• Tangible investments in ICT equipment together with intangible investments in soft-
ware and databases (ICT&Soft&DB). The combination of these investments turns
out to be crucial because of the intrinsic complementarity characterizing hardware
3Labour productivity PL measures how efficiently labour input is used in the production of goods and
services. It can be measured as the ratio between GDP and all the persons employed in the production process or
as the ratio between GDP and total hours worked. However, in the first case, the measure does not differentiate
between full-time and part-time employment. Therefore, in my analysis, I consider the hours worked as labour
input variable in the productivity measurement because "it bears a closer relation to the amount of productive
services provided by workers than simple head counts", see OECD (2001). So, in this case, PL represents the
amount of goods and services produced in one hour.
As regards capital productivity PK , it measures how efficiently capital input is used within production and
it is given by the ratio between GDP and capital services. The latter “refer to the flow of productive services
provided by an asset that is employed in production" and “are the appropriate measure of capital input in
production analysis", see OECD (2001).
Finally, total factor productivity (or multifactor productivity) reflects how efficiently labour and capital inputs
are employed together in the production process. Several factors can determine TFP variations, as for example
technological progress, organizational changes, network effects and spillovers. TFP is measured as the “residual
growth that cannot be explained by changes in labour and capital inputs", see OECD (2019).
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and software. Hardware is useless without software and viceversa and combining
these investments I can assess the real importance that digital technologies have in our
society. Indeed, besides the distinction between “tangible" and “intangible" capital,
another kind of common grouping is represented by “ICT" and “Non-ICT" capital
(or assets), where ICT capital includes IT, CT and computerized information, namely
Soft&DB, see Adarov and Stehrer (2019); Basu et al. (2004).
Software and hardware are also strictly related to each other from a technological
progress point of view. In fact, according to Brynjolfsson et al. (2018), AI software
and machine learning improvements are related to the creation of more powerful com-
puter hardware (and the availability of larger database). Therefore, complementary
investment in hardware turns out to be crucial in order to obtain further software
developments4.
The correlation analysis has been performed combining the EU KLEMS database5
(https://euklems.eu), which provided information about investments, and the OECD database
(https://stats.oecd.org) for information on productivity growth rates.
For each country, time averages of growth rates of different measures of productivity and
investments have been calculated for each of the three time periods considered. Table 1.1
reports correlation coefficients and p-values (in brackets) between this set of country average
growth rates. Asterisks points out statistically significant results6.
Table 1.2 reports main statistical moments, i.e. mean and standard deviation σ, of
investments and productivities growth rates for four representative countries among those
analyzed: Greece (EL), Ireland (IE), Germany (DE), and United States (USA). These
countries have been chosen according to their position in the data distribution. In particular,
Greece has been chosen as the representative of the lower bound, Ireland as the representative
of the upper one and Germany as median. USA is included because of its importance in the
world economy. Statistical moments refer to two different time periods, namely 1997-2007
4Besides tangible investments in ICT assets, Brynjolfsson et al. (2018) argue that AI software needs
complementary investments in other intangible assets, namely databases, human capital and organizational
capital.
5EU KLEMS database (where KLEMS stands for capital (K), labour (L), energy (E), material (M) and
service (S) inputs) collects data on industry level measures of productivity, capital formation, technological
change, economic growth and employment creation for the European union members, Japan and USA. These
data are meant to be used as effective inputs for policy evaluation and statistical analysis. For my research, I
have gathered investments data from the EU KLEMS Release 2019, see Adarov and Stehrer (2019); Stehrer
et al. (2019).
6Assuming a null hypothesis of non-correlation I consider three different levels of significance: a single
asterisk is used when p-values are lower than 0.1 whereas two and three asterisks are used when p-values are
lower than 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
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Table 1.1: The table shows the correlation coefficients and p-values (in brackets) between the
sets of country time averages of different kinds of investments and productivities growth rates.
Time averages refer to three different time periods, i.e. 1997-2007, 2008-2016, 1997-2016,
except for IE whose averages refer to shorter time periods because of the lack of data, namely
1997-2007, 2008-2014, 1997-2014. They have been considered three types of productivity
(total factor productivity (TFP), labour productivity (PL) and capital productivity (PK)) and
four types of investment (total intangible investments, intangible investments in software
and database, total tangible investments (without considering dwellings investments) and
tangible investments in ICT). Significant results have been pointed out with asterisks: a
single asterisk is used when p-values are lower than 0.1 whereas two and three asterisks
are used when p-values are lower than 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. The analysis takes into
account fifteen countries (IT, DE, NL, UK, USA, FR, SE, ES, DK, PT, AT, FI, IE, EL, LU) and
it has been realized using EU-KLEMS (www.euklems.net) and OECD (www.oecd.org) data.
1997-2007 2008-2016 1997-2016
TFP - Int tot 0,20 (0,48) 0,7025*** (0,0035) 0,40 (0,14)
PL - Int tot 0,28 (0,31) 0,7214*** (0,0024) 0,569** (0,027)
PK - Int tot -0,24 (0,39) -0,07 (0,82) -0,43 (0,11)
TFP - Int Soft&DB 0,17 (0,54) 0,05 (0,86) -0,02 (0,94)
PL - Int Soft&DB 0,13 (0,64) 0,19 (0,51) 0,05 (0,87)
PK - Int Soft&DB 0,20 (0,48) -0,35 (0,19) -0,17 (0,53)
TFP - Int R&D 0,19 (0,50) 0,465* (0,081) 0,28 (0,31)
PL - Int R&D 0,32 (0,25) 0,506* (0,054) 0,495* (0,060)
PK - Int R&D -0,37 (0,18) -0,13 (0,66) -0,541** (0,037)
TFP - Tang tot 0,30 (0,28) 0,475* (0,074) 0,6494*** (0,0088)
PL - Tang tot 0,38 (0,16) 0,32 (0,25) 0,7152*** (0,0027)
PK - Tang tot -0,16 (0,57) 0,22 (0,42) -0,15 (0,59)
TFP - Tang ICT 0,17 (0,56) 0,544** (0,036) 0,36 (0,19)
PL - Tang ICT 0,13 (0,63) 0,547** (0,035) 0,35 (0,20)
PK - Tang ICT 0,02 (0,94) 0,02 (0,93) 0,03 (0,92)
TFP - ICT&SOFT&DB 0,19 (0,49) 0,6519*** (0,0085) 0,34 (0,22)
PL - ICT&SOFT&DB 0,21 (0,46) 0,6460*** (0,0093) 0,40 (0,14)
PK - ICT&SOFT&DB 0,01 (0,96) 0,06 (0,84) -0,09 (0,75)
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Table 1.2: The table shows main statistical moments, namely time average and related
standard deviation (σ), of investments and productivities growth rate for Greece (EL), Ireland
(IE), Germany (DE), and United States (USA). Statistical moments refer to two different time
periods, namely 1997-2007 and 2008-2016, except for IE whose data refers to time intervals
1997-2007 and 2008-2014 because of the lack of data.
Greece (EL) Ireland (IE) Germany (DE) United States (USA)
1997-2007 2008-2016 1997-2007 2008-2014 1997-2007 2008-2016 1997-2007 2008-2016
Mean σ Mean σ Mean σ Mean σ Mean σ Mean σ Mean σ Mean σ
Tot Int 6,1 7,8 -4 11 15 22 8 17 3,6 2,9 3,2 2,2 5,5 3,1 2,7 1,9
Int Soft&DB 15 18 5 31 9 16 6,0 4,9 7,3 3,9 3,7 7,2 10,1 8,6 4,3 2,8
Int R&D 8,3 6,2 -2 11 18 29 9 20 2,7 2,7 3,3 2,7 4,1 1,4 1,8 2,4
Tot Tang 8 12 -5 13 9,9 7,3 1,0 14,2 1,9 4,2 0,5 6,8 3,0 4,0 0,3 6,8
Tang ICT 9 18 -6 22 14 22 7 29 5 12 0,4 9,2 13 12 3,0 5,2
ICT&Soft&DB 10 16 -4 14 11 14 6 16 5,8 8,7 1,9 7,3 11,1 9,2 3,8 2,6
TFP 1,3 1,9 -2,1 2,3 2,0 2,1 1,1 4,5 0,92 0,62 0,4 1,9 1,29 0,61 0,41 0,70
PL 2,6 2,4 -1,2 1,5 3,2 2,1 2,7 4,9 1,51 0,67 0,7 1,6 2,23 0,71 1,0 1,1
PK -1,8 1,4 -4,1 4,6 -1,8 2,4 -4,4 4,8 -0,5 1,1 -0,3 2,8 -1,7 1,1 -1,3 1,8
and 2008-2016, except for IE whose data refers to time intervals 1997-2007 and 2008-2014
because of the lack of data.
Significant results underline positive correlations between variables in all the cases except
for the negative correlation between capital productivity and intangible R&D investments
average growth rates in the 1997− 2016 time periods. In this respect, it is worth noting
that capital productivity, measured as the ratio between GDP and capital services, has been
decreasing in most OECD countries for the past twenty years, see OECD (2019), and this
fact may have affected the result.
In the time period 2008−2016 a considerable part of the results turns out to be highly
significant, highlighting a positive correlation between productivity and investments. In this
time period, TFP average growth rate is significantly and positively correlated with total
intangible, R&D, total tangible, ICT equipment and ICT&Soft&DB investments average
growth rates. Also labour productivity PL is positively correlated with total intangible, R&D,
ICT equipment and ICT&Soft&DB investments.
Even though the 1997−2007 time period is characterized mainly by positive relations
among variables, I did not find significant results.
Fig. 1.2 show the scatter plot between TFP and total intangible investments average
growth rates in the 1997− 2007 and 2008− 2016 time periods. The comparison of these
two plots highlights an increase in the correlation between variables in the 2008− 2016
time period, even though the growth rates tend to be lower. The same considerations hold
also for R&D and ICT&Soft&DB investments average growth rates, presented in Figures
1.3 and 1.4. In 2008−2016 time periods, even though the positive correlation coefficient
1.2 Productivity and digital assets: an empirical assessment 10
between TFP and Soft&DB intangible investments is not significant, TFP turns out to be
significantly and positively correlated with the sum of Soft&DB and ICT equipment that has
been called ICT&Soft&DB (the correlation coefficient is equal to 0.6519). This fact points
out the complementary roles of hardware and software.
The higher correlation coefficients in the post-crisis period of 2008−2016 might also be
explained along the lines of the cleansing effect of recessions, introduced by Caballero and
Hammour (1994). According to this idea, recessions can be seen as times of "cleansing" when
outdated or relatively unprofitable techniques and products are pruned out of the productive
system. Therefore, after the crisis of 2007, investments in new technology induced a higher
productivity growth with respect to the previous decade. Of course, many other factor might
have affected this result, in particular the political response in terms of institutional reforms
or economic policies. However, it is worth noting that the cleansing effect typically occurs in
all countries, irrespective of their local institutional arrangement or market structure.
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Figure 1.2: The figure shows two scatter plots between country TFP and total intangible
investments average growth rates (%). Country averages are considered for two different
time periods, namely 1997-2007 (a) and 2008-2016 (b), except for IE whose time average in
the subplot (b) refers to a shorter interval because of the lack of data, i.e. 2008-2014. The
correlation index is equal to 0.20 (a) and 0.7025 (b). Source: authors estimations based on
EU-KLEMS ((https://euklems.eu)) and OECD (https://stats.oecd.org) data.
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Figure 1.3: The figure shows two scatter plots between country TFP and R&D investments
average growth rates (%). Country averages are considered for two different time periods,
namely 1997-2007 (a) and 2008-2016 (b), except for IE whose time average in the subplot
(b) refers to a shorter interval because of the lack of data, i.e. 2008-2014. The correlation
index is equal to 0.19 (a) and 0.465 (b) respectively. Source: authors estimations based on
EU-KLEMS ((https://euklems.eu)) and OECD (https://stats.oecd.org) data.
1.3 Digital technological progress and its potential conse-
quences on labour market
Since the first industrial revolution, the potential consequences deriving from new waves of
technological progress have been discussed generating conflicting opinions. New technolo-
gies have always generated apprehension among the working class and even if the debate
among economists is still open, most of them agree on distinguishing between short and
long run effects. According to this distinction, in the short term innovation determines
lower employment levels and wages, whereas in the long term the higher productivity in the
production systems could determine an increase in employment and wages, see Mokyr et al.
(2015). In this respect, Ricardo (1821) argued that even though the introduction of machinery
is injurious to labour class, the short term displacement is only temporary: in the long run, the
technological unemployment leaves room to a higher labour demand. Therefore, according
to a sizable part of economists, the unemployment effect related to technological progress
is not constant, but it is absorbed by the economic system itself over time. In this respect,
Schumpeter (1939) affirms that economic cycles are strictly related to technological progress.
The latter leads to economic expansion periods followed by recession phases characterized
by supernormal unemployment. In the thought of Schumpeter, cyclical unemployment
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Figure 1.4: The figure shows two scatter plots between country TFP and ICT&Soft&DB
investments average growth rates (%). Country averages are considered for two different
time periods, namely 1997-2007 (a) and 2008-2016 (b), except for IE whose time average
in the subplot (b) refers to a shorter interval because of the lack of data, i.e. 2008-2014.
The correlation index is equal to 0.19 (a) and 0.6519 (b) respectively. Source: authors
estimations based on EU-KLEMS ((https://euklems.eu)) and OECD (https://stats.oecd.org)
data.
corresponds to technological unemployment and it is related to innovation process which
constitutes the essence of economic system evolution.
Obviously, technological progress does not always involve the same result. In this respect,
we can differentiate between two different kinds of technological innovation, i.e. product and
process innovation. The positive impact on employment resulting from the former has been
highlighted and underpinned by various researches, see e.g. Edquist et al. (2001); Vivarelli
and Pianta (2000), whereas the latter differs in its labour-saving nature allowing to produce
the same amount of output using less workforce. In fact, thanks to product innovation new
markets can be opened leading to an increase of production and employment, while process
innovation involves higher level of productivity determining a lower employment in the
production system, see Pianta (2009). It is worth noting that two main analysis levels can
be distinguished in order to investigate process innovation effects, namely the firm-level
and the industry-level. In this regard, according to Acemoglu et al. (2020), although firms
adopting automation decrease their workforce share in the production process, their overall
employment increases. In other words, process innovation induces a positive employment
effect at the firm-level. In fact, the adoption of automation determines a cost reduction and a
consequent increase of their market shares. However, their expansion on the market occurs
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at the expense of their competitors and it causes a negative overall effect on employment at
the industry-level.
According to the so-called “Compensation Theory", the negative effects linked to labour-
unfriendly process innovation are counteracted by several economic forces triggered by the
technological progress itself, see Petit (1993). In this respect, Vivarelli (2014) distinguishes
between six different compensation effects: the compensation mechanism “via additional
employment in the capital goods sector", “via decrease in prices", “via new investments", “via
decrease in wages", “via increase in incomes" and “via new products". Similarly, according to
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018a), the so-called “displacement effect" caused by the adoption
of digital technologies within production processes is counteracted by four countervailing
effects: the productivity effect, capital accumulation, deepening of automation and the
creation of new labour-intensive tasks. In particular, for the authors the creation of new
tasks and jobs in which human labour has a comparative advantage compared to capital
represents the most effective force capable of balancing the replacement of workers with
automated machines. According to Vermeulen and Pyka (2014), because of countervailing
effects triggered by the technological progress itself, the diffusion of artificial intelligence
(AI) and robots is determining a typical structural change rather than the so-called “end of
work".
However, it is worth highlighting that the nature of the new digital technological wave
experienced by our society is completely different compared to the previous ones. Most of
innovations introduced within production systems until the end of the XXth century had the
purpose to produce a huge amount of mechanical energy allowing to surmount the limits
imposed by human physical force. As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, nowadays,
according to Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014), we are experiencing a new technological
revolution called “The Second Machine Age". In this new era, trough the adoption of
new digital technologies such as AI, we can overcome limits imposed by our mind. In
this respect, the primary objective to be pursued adopting these new digital instruments is
represented by the automation of decision-making processes and this new kind of automation
makes us reflect about its potential future consequences on the labour market. Furthermore,
various economists and technologists contemplate the possibility that further developments in
computation and artificial intelligence will lead us to a technological singularity, see Aghion
et al. (2017); Good (1966); Nordhaus (2015), and the economic and social consequences of
these advances could be really disruptive.
In the next chapter, I am going to present the first framework of the Eurace model con-
cerning digital technologies that has been developed in order to study potential consequences
of the digital transformation. In this first framework, by virtue of the positive and significant
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correlation between ICT&Soft&DB and TFP, I have decided to model digital technological
progress through a total factor augmenting approach.
Chapter 2
Modelling the Digital Transformation:
the Total Factor Augmenting Approach
in Eurace
2.1 Literature overview
The main purpose of the thesis is to study the potential effects deriving from the digital
technological progress on our economy. In this regard, modelling the digital transformation
turns out to be crucial in order to forecast the consequences for the economy related to the
advent of new digital technologies.
The debate on how to represent the potential effects deriving from their adoption in
production processes is still open. Current literature includes different methods that have
been developed in order to assess unemployment, productivity change and wage inequality
deriving from the digital transformation. One of these is represented by including AI within
production functions as a new (production) factor, see DeCanio (2016); Hanson (2001);
Lankisch et al. (2019). Moreover, as pointed out by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018d), several
researchers have modelled the introduction of automation and AI in the manufacturing sector
as a factor augmenting technical change and digital transformation is represented by an
increase in factor productivity, see Acemoglu (2003). For instance, Graetz and Michaels
(2018); Nordhaus (2015); Sachs and Kotlikoff (2012) frame automation and AI impact
as a capital-augmenting technical change, whereas Bessen (2016, 2018, 2019) represents
automation as labour-augmenting.
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It is worth noting that Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017, 2018a,b,c,d) point out some
weaknesses of the factor augmenting approach in equilibrium models1 and they adopt the so-
called task-based approach based on the pioneering contribution by Zeira (1998): automation
advent is represented as an increase in the number of tasks that can be performed by machines.
Similarly, Aghion et al. (2017) develops AI through a task-based model.
2.2 The added value of agent based modelling
The criticism by Acemoglu and Restrepo holds in equilibrium models, whereas is not
directly applicable to the disequilibrium approach which is the distinguishing feature of
agent-based simulation models as the one presented in this chapter. In particular, differently
from equilibrium models whose main purpose is to find the static vector of prices equating
agents’ demand and supply schedules and making their expectations self-fulfilling, agent-
based computational modelling studies how agents’ actions, strategies, or expectations
endogenously change out-of-equilibrium and the aggregate economic patterns that this
dynamic process creates, see Arthur (2006, 2010). An example of how micro-level behavior
gives rise to a macro-level regularity, which is interesting in this context, is the network
effect in the adoption of a technological standard, i.e. the empirically-grounded modelling
feature according to whom the likelihood of adoption depends not only on the (not perfectly
known) quality of the standard but also on the number of its current users. This micro choice
behaviour can give rise in the long-run to a winner-take-all standard, which is not necessarily
the superior one from the technological standpoint, see Arthur (1989). Furthermore, who
is the winner can not be foreseen ex-ante based on agents’ preferences, as in a standard
equilibrium model, since the final outcome is path-dependent and small unpredictable
exogenous stochastic disturbances during the dynamic selection process can give rise to
different final outcomes. This macro level regularity can then be compared with the empirical
evidence, see e.g. the case of software industry Arthur (1996).
Agent-based macroeconomic model arose as an alternative to neoclassical economic
models, describing the economy as a complex evolving system in which macro dynamics
(e.g. business cycle, long run growth) emerge out of the micro interactions among bounded
rational agents, see Gallegati (2018); Hommes and LeBaron (2018); LeBaron and Tesfatsion
(2008); North and Macal (2007). Differently from the structural macro models of the 70s,
1Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018d) argue that “factor-augmenting technologies have a limited scope to reduce
the demand for labor". Another criticism made by the same authors refers to the impact of technology on
labour share in national income: it is strictly related to the elasticity of substitution between production factors.
Conversely, they argue that task-based approach “always reduces the labor share and it reduces labor demand
and the equilibrium wage unless the productivity gains from automation are sufficiently large."
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agent-based macroeconomics introduce explicit micro-foundations based on empirically
observed behaviours of individuals and organizations. Agents’ decisions and adaptation are
embedded in a world characterised by true Knightian uncertainty and dispersed information.
Agent-based modelling represents an appropriate approach in order to address complexity
and the main features characterizing the increasing returns world to which digital technology
producers belong. Out-of-equilibrium dynamics, complex interactions among economic
agents and heterogeneity are three important features that can be encompassed by agent-
based modelling. Since the AI advent can be framed as a transition phase in the history of
technological progress, an out-of-equilibrium approach, such as the agent-based one, can
be an effective way to represent this structural and productive transformation. Furthermore,
by capturing heterogeneity between economic agents we can distinguish between different
types of productive capital: hard capital and intangible or digital capital. The need for
heterogeneity to study the potential effect of a digital transformation is also reflected by
the labour force: workers are heterogeneous and they differ in skills. Finally, interactions
drive several features of the “increasing returns” world, such as for example network effects,
lock-in and winner-take-most-phenomena. These are the reasons why I adopted this approach
in order to conduct my research.
It is crucial to point out that the concept of innovation has already been investigated by
means of agent based models (see e.g Caiani et al. (2019); Dawid and Reimann (2011); Dosi
et al. (2010); Fanti (2018); Ponsiglione et al. (2017); Pyka et al. (2010); Rengs et al. (2020);
Vermeulen and Pyka (2014, 2018)), and also the well known large-scale macroeconomic
agent-based model Eurace has been endowed with the concept of innovation, see Dawid
and Gemkow (2014); Dawid et al. (2008, 2019, 2014, 2018). However, this research is
focused on innovation from the perspective of productivity increases due to intangible digital
capital goods, not only tangible ones. Software, algorithms, artificial intelligence and their
developers are the subject of my study, as I want to link the concept of innovation to the one of
“digital revolution", as described in Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2011). The addition of digital
technologies in the Eurace model mimics the advent of Industry 4.0, according to which
not only are the production processes automated, but also decisions start to be subject to
automation technology, see Cotteleer and Sniderman (2017); Kang et al. (2016); Parrott and
Lane (2017). From a macro perspective, the research work tries to address and evaluate the
potential effect of a digital transformation on the economic system. Furthermore, at a micro
level, my analysis aims to study the main business dynamics characterising digital technology
producers. In this respect, the novelty of my contribution concerns the introduction of a
new type of capital producer within Eurace: the intangible or digital assets developer. The
introduction of this new kind of firm, which belongs to the “increasing returns world”, turns
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out to be crucial in order to better understand and investigate the economic implication of
digital technologies on business, both from a macro and micro point of view. In fact, being a
bottom up approach, agent-based modelling gives us the opportunity to study not only the
macroeconomic trend of the system but also the sectorial behaviours.
2.3 The Eurace model with intangible digital assets
2.3.1 Software tools and computational framework
The baseline Eurace model and its extensions have been implemented using the Flexible
Large-scale Agent Modelling Environment (FLAME). This software represents a flexible
and generic agent-based modelling platform that can be used to model and simulate complex
system applications in various research fields, as for example economics and biology. The
FLAME software generates agent-based applications whose compilation and deployment
can be performed both on laptops and high performance computers2.
Models developed through this software are based on a specific method of computation
whose name is extended finite state machines. Indeed, each agent is represented as a
computational state machine which is composed of a certain number of states with transition
functions between them. Agents are endowed with a memory containing variables and
transition functions can read and write to these variables. Moreover, transition functions can
also read and write incoming and outgoing messages used in order to achieve communication
between agents. The model description is implemented in Extensible Markup Language
(XML) tag structures, whereas transition functions are written used the C programming
language.
FLAME is used in order to implement and simulate the Eurace model, whereas the output
analysis is performed with Matlab.
2.3.2 Outline of the baseline Eurace model
Building on the empirical analysis presented in Chapter 1, which shows a clear effect of
investments in ICT&Soft&DB on TFP, I have developed a new extension of Eurace, see
Mazzocchetti et al. (2020, 2018); Petrović et al. (2017); Ponta et al. (2018); Raberto et al.
(2012); Teglio et al. (2019, 2012). In particular, the extension presented in this chapter has
been described in Bertani et al. (2020a,b).
2See www.flame.ac.uk for further details on FLAME.
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The model includes several types of economic agents, in particular: consumption goods
producers (CGPs) that manufacture homogeneous consumption goods; a capital goods
producer (KGP), which produces investment goods (for instance machine tools); households
(HHs), that perform as workers, financial investors and consumers; and commercial banks
(Bs). There are also two policy maker agents: the government (G) and the central bank
(CB), responsible for fiscal and monetary policy, respectively. In order to study the impact
of digital technologies on the economic system, a new economic agent, i.e., the intangible
digital assets developer (DAD), has been designed and included in the model.
A graphical illustration of the Eurace model version that has been used in this paper is
reported in Fig. 2.1. Ellipses and rectangles represent the different agent typologies, whereas
arrows indicate the presence of current account monetary flows between the corresponding
agents. In particular, rectangles are used when only one instance of the agent class is
considered (and simulated) in the model, e.g. one government, while ellipses show the
presence of multiple heterogeneous instances of that agent class, e.g. several banks. The
yellow background refers to a newly introduced agent.
Agents interact in different decentralised or centralised artificial markets. The centralised
are consumption and capital goods, labour and credit markets, whereas decentralised is the
financial market where firms’ (or banks’) stocks and government’s bonds are traded. Bounded
rationality, limited capabilities of computation and limited information gathering characterise
agents’ behaviour. Finally, the Stock-Flow-consistency approach represents a distinctive
feature of the Eurace model, where each agent is in fact represented as a dynamic balance
sheet which includes the details regarding assets and liabilities; see Godin and Caverzasi
(2014); Godley and Lavoie (2012); Raberto et al. (2018).
The shortest time step in the model scheduling is the day, which is the frequency for
financial market transactions, however, most agents’ decisions occur on a weekly, monthly,
or even yearly periodicity, and are asynchronous. Consumption budget decisions are made
monthly by households but purchases are made on a weekly basis; all firms’ decision about
production planning have a monthly asynchronous periodicity, i.e., each firm has its own












Figure 2.1: Graphical representation of the present Eurace model in terms of agent classes (ellipses or rectangles) and current account
monetary flows (arrows). Rectangles are used when just one instance of the class in considered in the model, whereas ellipses are
intended to represent the presence of multiple heterogeneous instances of the agent class. The yellow background refers to a newly
introduced agent.
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In the following, I present a summary of the core decisions taken by the main agents in
the model.
Household
The household is active in the financial, labour, goods and housing markets. As a trader,
it allocates its financial wealth among the available assets, which are bonds issued by the
government and the stock of firms and banks. As a worker, if unemployed, the household
enters the labour market to evaluate pending job offers. It is randomly queued to apply
to the set of available jobs with the highest wages, provided that they are higher than the
reservation wage. Households receive a monthly salary, which constitutes, along with the
financial returns on bonds and stocks, the total income of the household. On the basis of total
income, households decide the consumption budget, according to a target wealth to income
ratio, in line with the buffer-stock saving behaviour theory (Carroll (2001)). Households’
decisions about the product to buy are driven by purchasing probabilities based on price.
Firm (CGP)
The firm in the Eurace model takes decisions about the factors of production and how to
finance them. Firms can ask credit from banks or they can issue new shares. They distribute
dividends to shareholders, which are initially all households (later it depends on financial
market transactions). In particular, I present the core of the scheduling procedure for firms.
• The firm estimates the expected demand based on past sales.
• It determines the new desired production, given the level of the current inventory stock.
• It computes the labour force needed to meet the production target, determining the
labour demand, and posting vacancies (if any), or firing. In particular, if the number
of workers is higher than that needed by the production target, CGP fires the workers
in excess, otherwise it enters the labour market to hire new employees. CGP sets an
initial wage offer and, if it is not capable of hiring all the workers needed, it increases
the initial offer by a fixed parameter and starts a second round. If the target is not
reached for the second time, CGP exits the labour market. However, it increases the
wage offer again and this will be the initial offer for the next monthly labour market
session, see Teglio et al. (2019).
• It determines a desired level of investment by comparing the net present value of
future additional cash flows with the current cost of investment. Investment goods are
produced by the capital goods producer (KGP).
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• The firm looks for financing, following the pecking order theory: first retained earnings,
then debt, then equity.
• If rationed, the firm reduces costs in order to make the total financial needs consistent
with the available resources. First, the total dividend payout is reduced to zero, then, if
still not sufficient, the investment plan is sized down and, eventually, the production
plan as well.
• The firm can go bankrupt, undergoing a restructuring of its debt with a related loan
write-off and a corresponding equity loss on creditor banks’ balance sheets, and staying
inactive for a period of time after which it enters the market again with a healthy balance
sheet. Physical capital of insolvent firms is therefore not lost but remains inactive for a
while.
Bank (B)
The bank role in the model is to provide credit to private agents; to firms in the form of
loans and to households in the form of mortgages. When a bank receives a loan request from
a firm, the request is evaluated and a loan eventually offered at a price that depends on the
risk associated to the default probability of the firm. A similar procedure is used by the bank
to assess the creditworthiness of households asking for mortgage loans (details are in Ozel
et al. (2019)). Bank’s lending is also limited by the obligation to respect the minimum capital
requirements enforced by Basel II regulation. It is worth noting that money in the model is
endogenous, as new deposits are created every time a bank issues new credit.
Policy makers
The central bank provides liquidity in infinite supply to banks, acting as lender of last
resort. It also sets the policy rate according to a dual mandate rule, i.e., low unemployment
and stable prices.
The government ensures a welfare system through fiscal policy. Taxes come from cor-
porate earnings, consumption (VAT), financial income and labour income. Government
expenditures include the public sector wage bill, unemployment benefits, transfers, and
interest payment on debt. On a monthly basis, if it is short of liquidity, the government issues
new bonds, which are perpetuities that pay a monthly fixed coupon.
The model has not been calibrated to any specific real-world economy; however, it is
worth noting that all agents’ balance sheet variables have been initialised in a consistent way
and with relative ratios derived from the literature or from the empirical evidence observed in
advanced economies. For instance, the initial debt-to-equity ratio of firms is set to 2, which is
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a realistic value for companies in the industrial sector; banks’ equity to risk-weighted assets
ratio is initialised to 20%. Furthermore, the initial value of public debt is set to a value that,
assuming a 10% unemployment rate and the initial productive capacity of firms, would set the
debt-to-GDP ratio at around 100%, which is in line with the average Eurozone value. As for
empirical validation, it is worth noting that the simulated time series generated by the model
match the main stylised facts about volatility of investments and consumption and about the
correlation structure of GDP. In particular, I observed that GDP is positively correlated with
investments and consumption, and it is anti-correlated with the unemployment rate. GDP
also shows a positive correlation with firms’ loans, which lead business cycle expansion,
and an anti-correlation with firms’ defaults, which follow a contraction of the economy. For
further details about the validation and calibration of the model, see Teglio et al. (2019).
As pointed out by Platt (2019), further developments of agent-based model calibration
techniques are required in order to definitively calibrate large-scale models, like Eurace;
however, future researches will explore the feasibility of a full calibration of the model or of
part of it, by resorting to Bayesian inference.
2.3.3 Eurace: a stock-flow-consistent model
Following Godley and Lavoie (2012) and Godin and Caverzasi (2014), a compact description
of the stock-flow-consistent Eurace model is presented through the following tables that out-
line the stocks (balance sheet entries) and flows (income statement entries) that characterise
the Eurace agents.
The stock-flow-consistent modelling approach provides a set of relevant theoretical
identities to the agent, sector, and aggregate level, whose subsistence need to be numerically
verified during the simulation, thus providing a very important diagnostic and validation tool
for the model and its implementation.
The first table presented is the agent class balance sheet table (Table 2.1), that shows the
asset and liability entries of each particular agent type.
The second one is the sectorial balance sheet table (Table 2.2), that presents the assets and
liabilities aggregated over a sector (all agents belonging to the same class). Columns report
the aggregated balance sheet of each sector, whereas rows identify the relations between
sectors by spotting the liabilities (with minus sign) in one sector and the corresponding claims,
i.e. assets (with plus sign), in another sector, thus generally summing to zero. Exceptions are:
the capital goods accumulated by firms; inventories; housing units and equity shares3 owned
by households.
3I assume that equity shares in households’ portfolio do not sum to zero with the corresponding equity
counterpart in the issuer balance sheet because of the usual difference between market price and book value.
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The third table is the cash flow matrix (Table 2.3), which shows the monetary flows
among sectors, both in the current and capital account. The current account reports aggregate
revenues (plus sign) and payments (minus sign) among sectors, therefore summing to zero
along the rows. The capital account reports the endogenous money creation/destruction
operations by means of borrowing/debt repayment by private agents with banks. These
operations, along with the current account net cash flows, determine the liquidity change of a
sector.
Finally, the fourth is the revaluation matrix (Table 2.4) that provides information about
changes in sectors’ net worth (equity) between periods. In particular, agents’ net worth
dynamics depends on net cash flows in the current account, physical capital depreciation
and price changes in financial (stocks and bonds) and real (housing units, capital goods and
inventories of consumption goods) assets.
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Table 2.1: Balance sheets of any agent class characterising the Eurace economy. Balance
sheet entries in the table have a subscript character, which is the index of an agent in the class
to which the variable refers. In some cases, we can find two subscript characters, where the
second one refers to the index of an agent in another class where there is the balance-sheet
counterpart. For instance, D f refers to the total debt of a firm f , i.e. a liability, and Lb refers
to the aggregate loans of a bank b, i.e. an asset. ℓ f ,b (or ℓb, f ) refer to the loans granted by
banks b to firms f . Of course, ∑b Lb = ∑ f ℓb, f represents an aggregate balance sheet identity,
that is verified throughout the entire simulation. nEh,x represent the number of outstanding
equity shares of agents x held by households h. The market price of the equity shares is
given by pEx . The stock portfolio’s value of household h is then computed as: ∑x nEh,x pEx .
Government bond numbers and market price are given by nG and pG, respectively.
Agent class Assets Liabilities
Household Liquidity: Mh Mortgages: Uh
abbrev.: HH Stock portfolio: Equity: Eh
index: h = 1, . . . ,NHous ΣbnEh,b pEb+
Σ f nEh, f pE f +
nEh,K pEK +
ΣdnEh,d pEd +
Gov Bonds: nh,G pG
Housing units: Xh
Consumption Goods Producer Liquidity: M f Debt: D f = ∑b ℓ f ,b
abbrev.: CGP Capital goods: K f Equity: E f
index: f = 1, . . . ,NFirm Inventories: I f
Capital Goods Producer Liquidity: MK Equity: EK
abbrev.: KGP Inventories: IK
Digital Assets Developers Liquidity: Md Equity: Ed
abbrev.: DAD Licences: nl,d
index: d = 1, . . . ,NDADs
Bank Liquidity: Mb Deposits :
abbrev.: B Db = ∑h Mb,h +∑ f Mb, f +Mb,K
index: b = 1, . . . ,NBank Loans: Lb = ∑ f ℓb, f CB standing facility: Db = ℓb,CB
Mortgages: Ub = ∑h Ub,h Equity: Eb
Government Liquidity: MG Outstanding government bonds value :
abbrev.: G DG = nG pG
Equity: EG
Central Bank Liquidity: MCB Outstanding fiat money: FiatCB
abbrev.: CB Loans to banks: LCB = ∑b ℓCB,b Deposits: DCB = ∑b Mb +MG












Table 2.2: Sectorial balance sheet matrix. Subscripts represent the index of the agent or of the sector (i.e. the set of all agents of the
same class) to which the stock refers. Uppercase indexes are used when the stock refers to the whole sector, e.g. F refers to the sector
of all CGPs and to the aggregate value of a particular stock in the sector, whereas lowercase subscripts are used when it refers to the
single agent (for instance in the case of sums). Finally, superscript characters are introduced in the case of government bond units
nG, i.e. nHG and n
CB




B , because the balance sheet counterpart (in the asset side) is held by two
sectors, i.e. households and central bank in the case of government bond units and consumption goods producers and renewable
power producers in the case of loans.
Sectors
Non-Financial Private Agents (NFPAs) Banks Policy Makers Σ
HHs CGPs KGP DADs Bs G CB
Tangible Capital +XH pX +KF pK +Xh pX +KF pK
Inventories +IF pC +IK pK +IF pC +IK pK









+MH +MF +MK +MDAD -DB





Gov Bonds +nHG pG –nG pG +n
CB
G pG 0
Equity Shares (+) /
Net worth (-)
+Σ f nE f pE f –EF +Σ f nE f pE f −EF
+nEk pEk –EK +nEk pEk −EK
+ΣdnEDAD,d pEDAD,d –EDAD ΣdnEDAD,d pEDAD,d −EDAD
+ΣbnEb pEb –EB +ΣbnEb pEb −EB
–EH –EG –ECB −EH −EG −ECB
Σ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 2.3: Sectorial transaction flow matrix of agents populating the EURACE economy.
Note that HH stands for Households, CGP stands for Consumption Goods Producer, KGP
stands for Capital Goods Producer, DAD stands for Digital Assets Developers, Gov stands
for Government and CB stands for Central Bank.
HHs CGPs KGP DAD Bs G CB Σ
Current
Account
Consumption goods – + 0
Investment goods – + 0
Licences – + 0
Training courses – + 0
Wages + – – – – 0
Transfers + – 0
Taxes – – – – – + 0
Dividends + – – – – 0
Coupons + – + 0
CB coupon payback + – 0




CB loan interest – + 0
CB interest payback + – 0
= = = = = = =
Net cash flow Savings Profits Profits Profits Profits Surplus Seignoirage 0
Capital
Account





∆ Mortgages +UH - UH 0
∆ Issue of new
shares / bonds
–Σ f pE f ∆nE f
–pG∆nG









& ∆ Banks’ deposits
–∆ MH –∆ MF –∆ MK –∆ MDAD +∆ DB 0
∆ Banks / Public
Liquidity
& ∆ Central bank
deposits
–∆ MB –∆ MG +∆ DCB 0

















Table 2.4: Sectorial revaluation matrix. The matrix provides information about changes in sectors’ net worth (equity) between periods.
Net worth changes depend on net cash flows in the current account, physical capital depreciation (at rate ξK) and price changes in
real and financial assets. It is worth noting that net worth of the issuers of financial assets (firms and the government) are not subject
to asset price changes.
HHs CGPs KGP DADs Bs G CB Σ
Equityt−1 EH,t−1 EF,t−1 EK,t−1 EDAD,t−1 EB,t−1 EG,t−1 ECB,t−1 ETOT,t−1
Net cash flow +Savings +Profits +Profits +Profits +Profits +Surplus +Seignoirage 0
Revaluations/
Devaluations
Housing units +ΣhXh∆pX +ΣhXh∆pX
Capital
+Σ f K f ∆pK
-Σ f ξKK f pK
+Σ f K f ∆pK -Σ f ξKK f pK
Inventories +Σ f I f ∆pc +IK∆pK +Σ f I f ∆pc +IK∆pK
Equity shares















= = = = = = = =
Equity EH,t EF,t EK,t EDAD,t EB,t EG,t ECB,t ETOT,t
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2.3.4 Supply side
In this study, the Eurace model is enriched with a new class of productive capital, which is
represented by intangible digital assets, say software or any other digitized knowledge-based
assets, e.g., algorithms, advanced routines, instructions. These new capital assets are devel-
oped and supplied by a new class of agents, namely the intangible digital assets developer
(DAD), and are employed in the production process by CGPs with the purpose of raising
their total factor productivity (TFP). Intangible digital assets are heterogeneous among the
different DADs active in the economy, depending on their accumulated digital knowledge,
which increases over time based on the R&D investments made. Obviously, this new type of
asset implies the existence of a novel digital market, in which DADs can potentially compete.
In line with the literature on intangible capital, see e.g. Haskel and Westlake (2017),
it is assumed that intangible digital assets are non-rivalrous, i.e., they are characterised by
zero marginal production costs. In particular, production costs are actually given only by the
R&D costs, which are determined by the cumulated labour costs of the skilled labour force
employed at any DAD agent.
On a monthly basis, each DAD agent d has a chance to develop a new version of its
digital capital asset, which is characterised by higher knowledge content, and therefore higher
productivity when employed in the production process by CGPs. The probability probd of
a successful completion of the new digital asset version depends on the cumulated person





where η is a shape parameter, homogeneous across all DAD agents, setting the development
speed, i.e., the higher η is, the higher the probability to develop an improved version of digital
assets is, for any level of cumulated person months Md employed. The rationale behind
Eq. 2.1 is to set the probability as an increasing monotone function of cumulated human
efforts devoted to R&D, but with decreasing returns to scale. It is also worth noting that
R&D is modelled here as an uncertain activity whose positive outcome, i.e., a higher level of
knowledge reached by the DAD, leading to an improved version of its produced digital asset,
is never granted in principle, since the probability is equal to 1 only asymptotically for an
infinite number of person months.
DADs determine the number of employees monthly according to their revenues, precisely
the workforce needed is set so that the wage bill is a fixed fraction of the DAD’s monthly
turnover. Obviously, this means that the number of employees in the DADs sector is
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influenced not only by revenues, but also by the average wage characterising the economy.
Basically, DADs embodie the essence of Schumpeterian entrepreneurship: they represent the
engine of innovation and technological progress within the Eurace macroeconomic system.
Concerning the hiring process, DADs enter the labour market and perform exactly the
same procedures as CGPs with whom they compete for the labour force. However, there is an
important difference: while CGPs hire households from the highest (fifth level) to the lowest
(first) education level indistinctly, yet prioritising highly educated workers, DADs employ
only workers with a high degree of education (from the third level upwards) to employ them
in research activities and then develop new intangible digital assets.
2.3.5 Demand side
Intangible digital assets are demanded by CGPs which pay a user licence to DADs for
their utilisation. In particular, digital assets, namely software, are integrated within “hard"
capital purchased by the KGP. “Hard" capital shall be considered as a generalized mean of
production which represents the physical part of: machine tools, computerized numerical
control machines, robots, computing equipment (or computer hardware), communications
equipment, etc. These means of production need software in order to work; in this regard, it is
assumed that each unit of “hard" capital needs to be associated with a digital asset license. The
modelling assumptions of integrating digital assets with “hard" capital in the consumption
goods production process and associating them with productivity are grounded on the
empirical analysis presented in the previous chapter, where I found a positive correlation
between ICT equipment (hard capital) and Soft&DB (digital assets) investments with total
factor productivity. This modeling assumption embodies the concept of complementarity
between hardware and software. According to the model design, every CGP adopts one
intangible digital technology at a time, i.e. its digital assets in use are supplied by only one
DAD.
The knowledge level of the digital technology employed sets the TFP of the CGP. In
particular, along the lines of Teglio et al. (2019), I consider the labour force N f , employed
at any CGP f , and its physical capital endowment K f , as the production factors used for
the production of consumption goods qC f , according to a Cobb-Douglas technology with
constant returns to scale, i.e.,
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where α and β are the production elasticity parameters and γ f is the TFP. An important
novelty with respect to the baseline Eurace model is that γ f is no longer a homogeneous
constant across all the CGPs but a variable, specific to each CGP, which increases over time
based on the knowledge content κd of the digital asset adopted by each CGP, i.e. the digital
knowledge level reached by its supplying DAD agent. In other words, according to the
empirical findings reported in the previous chapter, in particular to the positive correlation
between TFP and both R&D and ICT&Soft&DB investments, the impact of digital assets
innovation on production processes is modelled as total factor augmenting, namely as
increasing the value of TFP. Moreover, also the empirical analysis made by Haskel and
Westlake (2017) shows a high correlation between total factor productivity and intangible
investments. Therefore, a total factor augmenting approach can be considered as a suitable
modelling choice to capture a key empirical fact connected to the digital transformation of
the economy.
Furthermore, according to Uzawa (1961), a technological progress is both Hicks and
Harrod neutral (labour-augmenting) if and only if the production function is in the form
of Eq. 2.2. Although the debate concerning the average trend of technological progress
is still open among economists, the literature regarding empirical analysis leans towards
Hicks and Harrod neutrality. This tendency underpins my choice to adopt the Cobb-Douglas
production technology with constant return to scale to model the introduction of digital
intangible innovation, see Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2018); Kalt (1978); Solow (1957).
The TFP γ f is modelled as follows:
γ f = exp(1+ηγκd) (2.3)
where ηγ is a scale parameter homogeneous across all CGPs whereas κd represents the
knowledge level of the digital asset adopted. In case of a successful R&D activity, the latter
increases by a fixed tick equal to δκ according to the following relation:
κdt = κdt−1 +δκ (2.4)
The TFP growth has been formulated as exponential in order to model a strong and
significant impact of digital technological progress on the economy. In particular, an expo-
nential growth trend allows to consider an increasing relevance of digital technologies on the
production process and then on the labour market. Moreover, growth rates productivity data
provided by OECD suggests a long-term exponential trend of TFP, albeit with a declining
rate, and this further justifies my modelling assumption.
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It is worth noting that, while in the baseline Eurace version total factor productivity also
depends on the workforce’s specific skills1, in this extension it is assumed that TFP γ f is only
influenced by the digital technological progress.
For the right of use of its intangible digital technology, a DAD agent d charges CGP f a
monthly amount of money proportional to the level of capital endowment K f of CGP f , i.e.,
an amount equal to pDd K f , where pDd , set by the DAD agent, could be considered as a user
licence unit price. The rationale of this modelling feature is that, even if intangible digital
assets are non-rivalrous, then replicable many times at no additional cost irrespective of the
size of the CGP’s capital, the related services of installation, maintenance, and assistance,
which I assume are provided by DADs as well, are an increasing monotone function of the
size of capital stock. For instance, often the price of software licences depends on the number
of computers where it is installed. For the sake of simplicity, it is stated that this dependence
is linear and that the DAD agent simply charges a unit licence cost pDd multiplied by the
size of physical capital, say computers, or more generally physical machines that can be
automatised and therefore more productive, due to intangible digital technology.
On a monthly basis, the CGP has a given exogenous probability prob f to consider the
adoption of a different digital technology, i.e. to assess costs and benefits of switching from
the present digital supplier d to another one d∗. In particular, the cost-benefit analysis consists
of computing the net present value (NPV) of expected net future cash flows that the CGP




C f −qC f )
rD
+
(pDd − pDd∗ )K f
rD
−wN̂ f , (2.5)
where the first term gives the present value of the gain (loss) in future revenues, the second
addend is given by difference between the user licence unit price of the new digital technology
under consideration and the one currently in adoption, the third and final term takes into
account the training costs that the firm would face for its personnel to manage the new digital
technology. The variable rD represents the weighted average cost of capital proxied by the
corporate loan rate. In particular, the first addend of Eq. 2.5 takes into account that the
difference in productivity between the two technologies (see Eq. 2.3) generates a different
expected production level, given the present endowment of production factors, according to
Eq. 2.2, and therefore different expected future revenues2. The second term of Eq. 2.5 takes
into account the difference in the user licence bill. In this respect, the CGP usually faces a
1Households are endowed with a specific skill which varies according to their labour activity: the longer
their job career, the higher the specific skill value.
2The implicit assumption made here is that all consumption goods will be sold at the present price pC f .
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trade-off between expected higher (lower) future revenues due to a more (less) productive
alternative digital technology and higher (lower) costs for the digital services provided by
the DAD, since higher (lower) productivity of the digital asset are usually accompanied with
higher (lower) unit user licence price, as outlined in the next subsection.
2.3.6 Digital asset price dynamics
On a monthly basis, each CGP transfers to its reference DAD d a money amount to pay the
licence fee, which is equal to the unit licence price PDd times the number of licences held by
the consumption goods producer.
The unit licence price is set by the DAD. To study the behaviour of the economic system
under two different competitive scenarios, two different pricing mechanisms have been
considered, namely “price collusion” and “price competition” regimes. Under the “price
collusion” regime, all DADs adopt the same unit licence price PDd over time, whereas in
the competitive case, each DAD adapts the licence price independently according to the
dynamics of licence sales, with the purpose of getting market shares. In both cases, the
licence price is proportional to the average wage w in the economy. The rationale of this
modelling choice is to relate the dynamics of revenues of digital firms (DADs) to the one of
costs, which consist only of labour costs, i.e. wages.
The user licence unit price pDd for each DAD in case of “collusive pricing" follows this
relation:
pDd = λw (2.6)
where the mark-up λ , in case of “collusive pricing", is an exogenous and homogeneous
parameter, while in the “competitive" case the price can increase or decrease over time
according to a simple rule of thumb based on past sales. If the DAD increases the number of
licences sold , it also increases the mark-up by a fixed tick equal to δλ , otherwise it reduces
prices by the same amount: λt+1 = λt +δλ if Qt > Qt−1λt+1 = λt −δλ if Qt ≤ Qt−1 (2.7)
This variable mark-up policy allows DADs to manage the fluctuations of sales by means of a
trade-off between mark-up and market shares, see Fraser (1985); Goldstein (1986a,b). In
fact, DADs perform their business activities in an economic environment characterised by
uncertainty and, in case of sales contractions, a lower price could determine higher revenues
by gaining market shares at the expense of competitors. In this respect, as shown in Eq. 2.5,
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the user licence unit price could determine the transition from certain digital technologies to
cheaper ones. Furthermore, through this pricing behavioural assumption, DADs can exploit
expansion phases of their sales, thereby increasing their profits by raising mark-up.
Therefore, in case of “competitive pricing", λ assumes a heterogeneous and variable
connotation.
2.3.7 Employees’ digital technologies skills
The third term of the Eq. 2.5 is related to the training costs which a company should bear in
order to train workers with the alternative digital technologies. Every worker is endowed
with a set of “digital technologies" skills, that can be as large as the number of DADs
present in the economy. These skills represent the employee’s ability to handle the different
types of digital assets, which can be augmented by means of training courses provided by
the DADs. Therefore, revenues of DADs come from two different activities: the selling
of licences and training courses. From a modelling point of view, the training costs for
the company are given by the number of workers (N̂ f ) that are still not trained with the
“digital technologies", multiplied by the training cost per worker (w) which is equal to the
average wage characterising the macroeconomic system. The lower these switching costs,
the higher the probability of adopting a new kind of digital asset. In fact, with this particular
micro-assumption, I want to model the presence inside Eurace macro-economy of an indirect
network effect according to which economic benefits arise indirectly from the interaction
of different groups, Belleflamme and Peitz (2018); Farrell and Klemperer (2007); Heinrich.
Indeed, companies virtually benefit from the "digital technologies" skill of their workers and
this precisely happens when they are assessing a possible digital asset change: the higher the
number of workers with that particular skill, the lower the transition costs to that alternative
digital technologies which could be cheaper or more productive, see 2.5. Obviously, not
only companies can benefit from the skills acquired by their workers in case of a digital
technology transition but, at the same time, DADs can profit from employees’ skills: the
higher the number of workers able to use their digital assets, the higher the probability of
selling their products.
The diffusion of these skills among workers increases competitiveness lowering the
switching costs between digital technologies. In fact, skills propagation inside the model
allows CGPs to pass more easily from one technology to another by reducing switching costs.
In this respect, it is worth noting that, on a monthly basis, a fraction of workers resigns to
find better job opportunities or is fired by CGPs. This continuous turnover characterising the
Eurace labour market helps the diffusion among CGPs of the predominant digital technologies
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reflected in the long term inside the economy by the number of workers with that “digital
technologies" skill.
Moreover, these skills do not influence CGPs production processes or employment
sessions. In fact, in this version of the model, firms are willing to bear training courses costs:
their hiring preference is oriented to education levels. Even though a CGP’s production is
not affected by digital technologies skills, each worker must be trained to manage the digital
asset adopted in order to start the process.
2.4 Computational results
2.4.1 Design of experiments
The new features of the model allow to analyse different scenarios. In particular, I consider
two digital asset pricing scenarios. In the first one, named “collusive pricing", DADs sell their
licences at the same price, determined as a fixed share of the nominal wage. In the second
one, henceforth “competitive pricing" scenario, I endowed the firm with the possibility of
independently raising or decreasing their licence prices; the choice between these two options
depends on the market share owned by them: the bigger the share, the higher the price and
vice versa, as outlined in the previous section. In order to conduct an in-depth analysis, I
explore the two cases previously described with six different values of η , the parameter
which controls the probability of developing an improved version of the digital asset, see Eq.
2.1; in this way I obtain twelve different scenarios.
The methodology of this study is based on Monte Carlo computational experiments: each
scenario is simulated with twenty different seeds of the pseudorandom number generator.
So, a total of 240 simulations has been considered in order to conduct the investigation. All
the parameters are identical across the different scenarios except for η . The computational
results shown in the following subsections, in accordance with the methodology used, are
presented in the form of boxplots, a practical way to present data distribution. In particular,
each boxplot shows the distribution of the time averages of relevant variables over a twenty-
year-long time interval, including the twenty simulations characterised by different seeds.
Boxes enclose the values from the first to the third quartile, and include whiskers, which
extend up to the minimum and maximum data points that are not considered outliers. The
horizontal segments inside the boxes represent the median of the distribution. In order to give
a complete overview of the model response, I also plot the time series of the most important
variables of interest, so as to show the trend during the entire twenty-year-long simulation;
all time series considered refer to a specific seed.
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This analysis aims to investigate the behaviour of DADs at a micro level in order to
verify the possible existence of phenomena that characterise the increasing-returns world,
see Arthur (1996), and at the macro level to assess the impact of this new industrial sector on
the economic dynamics.
Furthermore, I enrich the study focusing the analysis on the “competitive pricing"
scenarios, comparing them with a case characterized by the absence of digital technological
progress and digital assets. In this way, it is possible to understand in a deeper way the
potential implications related to technological progress. In this respect, ensemble averages
over twenty seeds, along with related standard errors, of time averages over a twenty-years-
long period of the most relevant economic variables are presented.
2.4.2 “Competitive pricing" and “collusive pricing" business dynam-
ics analysis
As we can see in Fig.2.2(a), “competitive pricing" scenarios are characterised by higher
values of TFP (γ f ) compared to “collusive pricing" ones, independently of the value of the
innovation probability function shape parameter η ; this is due to the higher unit user licence
price pDd (whose distribution is reported in Fig.2.2(b)), that in case of “competitive pricing"
can be managed by the DADs in order to increase their revenues. Higher turnover does not
necessarily involve higher R&D intensity, represented by the person months employed by
the DAD, because, as already explained in the previous section, I link the cost structure
to the revenues structure through the average wage w, see Eq. 2.6. So, the variable that
effectively affects the R&D intensity is the mark-up λ , which in case of “collusive pricing"
is fixed throughout the simulation, while in the other case varies according to the DAD
pricing strategy, see Eq. 2.7. In presence of “competitive pricing", the average value of the
mark-up λ results to be higher, see Fig.2.4(b), and this fact leads to higher employment in
the DADs industrial sector (see Fig. 2.2(c)), and as a consequence to a greater average TFP
γ f . At the same time, obviously the TFP γ f increases with η which determines the shape
of the innovation probability function, see Eq. 2.1. The parameter η sets the likelihood
that cumulated R&D activities may have an actual impact. In this respect, R&D intensity is
linked to the mark-up λ . It is very important to note that the competition between DADs,
related to the possibility of freely managing the price of their licences leads to an increase
in the average price itself compared to the “collusive pricing" case, but, at the same time, it
involves a higher quality of digital capital assets for consumption goods producers, which is
reflected by the TFP γ f . In fact, in the “collusive pricing" case, DADs are limited in hiring
new researchers because of their lower mark-up λ and obviously this fact implies a lower
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Figure 2.2: The figure shows a series of boxplots representing, for any values of η and for
any pricing scenario considered, the distribution of: the average total factor productivity γ f
(a), the average unit user licence price pDd (b), the employment in the DADs industrial sector
(c), the Herfindahl market power index (d). Each boxplot reports the distribution of the time
averages over a twenty-year time period for each one of the twenty seeds considered.
productivity for their digital assets. Furthermore, the competition between DADs established
by “competitive pricing" is accentuated by η ; indeed the unit licence price pDd decreases as
the innovation probability function shape parameter η enhances. At the same time, although
the average price decreases in case of high values of η , the market concentration increases3,
as is visible in Fig.2.2(d). This emerging phenomenon, that I call the “converse concentration
effect" appears in contradiction with standard wisdom, according to which competitive
markets, characterised by lower prices, are not concentrated. In this case, the competition
represented by lower prices and consequently by lower values of mark-up λ , arises in order
to contrast the market concentration that characterises the “Increasing-returns World" in
which, by exploiting the right wave, a firm can become the market leader. What stimulates
the emergence of a product over others, and consequently the birth of market concentration,
is competitiveness; after acquiring the highest market share, the leader company can afford
3To represent the market concentration I use a standard measure: the Herfindahl index, see Kwoka (1985)
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to raise its price but always in agreement with the value perceived by the customer (related to
productivity and price). At the same time other competitors, in order to gain market shares,
tend to decrease their product prices. The result is a reduction of the average price. Therefore,
the digital assets market turns out to be very susceptible to unit licence price pDd variations
and the result is the absence of price overshoot effects, see also Fig. 2.5 (c).
It is worth noting that productivity (which represents the digital asset quality inside the
model) and the “right price" combined together are the key to a company’s success. On the
other hand, in the “collusive pricing" scenario, the Herfindahl index turns out to be high for
each value of η; this happens because only “fortune" leads to the emergence of a market
leader and not a decision-making strategy. In particular, “fortune" is represented by the
randomness related to Eq. 2.1 which is not counterbalanced by any “competitive pricing"
strategy.
Going further with the analysis, the high employment in the digital technologies sector,
in case of “competitive pricing", seems to represent the transition from a mass-production
economy to a high-tech services economy. The “displacement effect" in the consumption
goods industrial sector, due to the enhancement of productivity of the digital assets, is
contrasted by the creation of new jobs in the sector of DADs. This behaviour is clearly
visible in Fig. 2.3 (a) and (b) where the employment concerning the DADs industrial sector
increases over time, while CGPs hire fewer and fewer employees because of high digital
asset productivity (or TFP γ f ). As a matter of fact, it represents the so-called compensation
mechanism “via additional employment in the capital goods sector": the higher demand
for labour from the digital technologies industrial sector contrasts the “displacement effect"
generated by the digital transformation of the economy, see Vivarelli (2014). Despite the
creation of these new job opportunities, at the same time, for high level of TFP γ f DADs are
not able to absorb all the unemployment created by their digital assets; Fig. 2.4(a) shows an
increase of unemployment caused by the enhancement of the innovation probability function
shape parameter η over time in both cases. It is interesting to note that for the first two
values of η (0.05 and 0.1) the unemployment is higher in case of “collusive pricing"; this is
related to the fact that up to these values, in case of “competitive pricing", DADs can absorb
the unemployment caused by their digital assets. Beyond those values, the “displacement
effect" is too high; in fact, we can see a significant difference between average productivity
in the two cases, see Fig. 2.2(a). As shown in Fig. 2.4 (c), the total number of licences
sold decreases with η both in case of “competitive" and collusive “pricing“; logically, this
is due to the higher value of TFP γ f which involves a lower stock of capital goods for the
same output. Accordingly, the trend of TFP γ f , in case of “collusive pricing" the number of
licences is higher compared to the “competitive pricing" case.
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Figure 2.3: The figure displays various time series in case of “competitive pricing" and
η = 0.3; in particular it shows: the percentage (a) and number of employees (b) in the
various industrial sectors: consumption goods producers (CGPs), capital goods producers
(KGPs), digital asset developers (DADs); total unemployment (c) and average total factor
productivity γ f (d). All time series refer to a specific replication which is representative of
the system average trend in case of “competitive pricing" and η = 0.3.
2.4.3 Competitiveness in the "competitive pricing" case
In this subsection, I present a micro-analysis concerning the competitive dynamics involving
the digital assets industrial sector in the “competitive pricing" case. Fig. 2.5 displays the
trend of the most important variables related to the DADs already mentioned above. It is
very interesting to notice that a company assumes a market leading position; the emergence
of this DAD over others is due to successful R&D activities, which allows it to develop
technologies with higher productivity. Besides the innovation probability function shape
parameter η , R&D activities are influenced by the cumulated person months Md employed
since the latest improvement: the higher the value of Md , the higher the probability to
develop an improved version of digital asset, see Eq. 2.1. The cumulated person months
Md is influenced by revenue, therefore, the DAD with the highest market share performs the
highest R&D. Despite the attempt of other DADs to recover the lost market shares, through
a decrease of their licence prices, in the long-term the leader DAD improves its product
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Figure 2.4: The figure shows a series of boxplots representing, for any value of η and for any
pricing scenario considered, the distribution of: unemployment (%) (a), average mark-up λ
(b) and total number of licences in the economy (c). Each boxplot reports the distribution of
the time averages over a twenty-year time period for each one of the twenty seeds considered.
and the higher productivity of its digital assets covers the price difference with respect to
product competitors. This trend could be considered as a representation of Arthur theory
concerning the economy of “increasing returns", according to which, thanks to its ability
and strategy, a company could lock-in the market. Furthermore, Fig. 2.5 shows that, even
if the DAD2 has a higher number of users (that are CGPs) compared to DAD3, the latter
has sold (or renewed) a higher number of licences in the middle of the simulation (around
time 96), because licences are proportional to the capital shares of user companies. This is
what seems to make the difference because revenues depend on licences and not on users
in general. This result underlines the importance for the DAD to have stable customers and
to possibly guarantee their growth, because this could determine a growth of the high-tech
producer itself. Therefore, the model highlights an interdependence between the two different
industrial sectors, showing how a potential slowing-down in the CGPs’ economic activity
could determine a deceleration in the DADs activity. In other words, CGPs sustain DADs
helping them to innovate their products and, at the same time, CGPs, in order to be more
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Figure 2.5: The figure displays various time series in case of “competitive pricing" and
η = 0.3; in particular it shows: number of licences (a), number of users (b), unit user
licence price pDd (c) and total factor productivity γ f (d) of the three different digital assets
developers. All time series refer to a specific replication which is representative of the system
average trend in case of “competitive pricing" and η = 0.3.
productive and competitive, need digital assets. The interaction between these two industrial
sectors highlights the complexity of the intangible digital economy.
2.4.4 The digital economy from a macroeconomic perspective
As shown in Fig. 2.6(d), in both pricing cases, the consumption goods price level decreases
with high values of the innovation probability function shape parameter η , due to the increase
of the average TFP γ f . The latter allows one to save both capital and labour force, as we can
see from the higher unemployment, see Fig. 2.4 (a). In other words, higher values of TFP
determine a decrease in production costs. In this respect, the lower average unit user licence
price pDd has a positive impact on the price of consumption goods, as shown in Fig. 2.2
(b). In fact, CGPs follow a mark-up pricing rule on unit costs, where costs are represented
by: wages, debt interests, licences and training courses, see Fabiani et al. (2006); Plott and
Sunder (1982).
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Fig. 2.6 (c) shows a slight decrease of the average nominal wage characterising the
economy which influences the consumption goods price level. Moreover, Fig. 2.6 (c) shows
an important difference between the two market scenarios: the average wage is much higher
in case of “competitive pricing".
According to the mark-up pricing-rule on unit costs, the “collusive pricing" case shows
lower consumption goods prices because of a lower unit user licence price pDd and average
wage w, see Fig. 2.2(b) and Fig. 2.6(c) respectively. In case of “competitive pricing", the
higher average wage w, representative of a greater purchasing power, determines higher real
sales compared to the “collusive pricing" case for any value of η . However, the higher level
of real sales is not only determined by the higher average nominal wage, but also by the
lower consumption goods price level. In other words, Eurace is able to capture the so-called
compensation mechanism “via decrease in price": the costs reduction leads to a prices
decrease which in turn determines a higher demand of goods. However, this compensation
mechanism together with the “via additional employment in the capital good sector" one is
not able to balance effectively all the technological unemployment in the CGPs industrial
sector.
The decrease of the central bank interest rate with the enhancement of η shows the intent
of the policy maker to increase employment fostering new investments, see Fig. 2.6 (a).
2.4.5 The “competitive pricing" case: a deeper investigation
In this subsection, a deeper analysis concerning the “competitive pricing" case is presented.
In particular, the various “competitive pricing" scenarios are compared with a base scenario,
in which digital technologies and their technological progress are not considered.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 display ensemble averages over twenty seeds, along with related
standard errors, of time averages over a twenty-years-long period of the most relevant
economic variables. These data confirm all the considerations developed in the previous
subsections.
As reported in Table 2.5, in case of no intangible investments, the unemployment level
tends to be higher compared to the case η = 0.05. This is related to the interaction between
the “displacement effect" and the compensation mechanism “via additional employment
in the (digital) capital goods sector" as mentioned above. For the lowest value of η , this
compensation mechanism is able to absorb effectively the unemployment generated by
digital technologies in CGPs creating also additional job places, while for higher value of
η , “displacement effect" takes over on it leading in certain case to mass unemployment.
Moreover, it is possible to affirm that for η = 0.1 the unemployment level is acceptable. As
a matter of fact, besides the compensation mechanism “via additional employment in the
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Figure 2.6: The figure shows a series of boxplots representing, for any values of η and for
any pricing scenario considered, the distribution of: Central bank interest rate (a), real
sales (b), average wage (c), consumption goods price level (d). Each boxplot reports the
distribution of the time averages over a twenty-year time period for each one of the twenty
seeds considered.
capital goods sector", also the “via decrease in price" one emerges4; for this value of η ,
the join effect of this two compensation mechanisms is able to counteract effectively the
technological unemployment.
For high values of η , i.e. η = 0.4; 0.5, the economic system is strongly affected by
digital technological progress whose impact results to be very significant also because of
the exponential TFP growth shape. Fig. 2.7 shows that for high η values the “displacement
effect" caused by digital technologies increases dramatically over time: digital assets substi-
tute workers in jobs that they previously performed in the mass production industrial sector
4The consumption goods price level is lower for η = 0.1 compared to the case without intangible investments.
This fact is strictly related to the higher TFP γ f which has doubled because of technological progress. This fact
allows firms to produce the same amount of output using less input factors.
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Table 2.5: For each variable and scenario considered, the table shows ensemble average (and
related standard error in brackets) of time averages distributions over a twenty-years-long
time period. The variables reported are: average TFP (γ f ), unemployment level (%), average
real wage (e), consumption goods sold quantity. The analysis takes into account six different
values of η and the case characterized by the absence of intangible investments.




consumption CGs price level
No Int Inv 1 (0) 2.76 (0.27) 2.681 (0.013) 9768 (75) 0.7433 (0.0050)
η= 0.05 1.610 (0.035) 1.79 (0.20) 3.539 (0.062) 13657 (289) 0.792 (0.020)
η= 0.1 2.006 (0.058) 4.31 (0.55) 3.965 (0.073) 16290 (426) 0.684 (0.015)
η= 0.2 3.79 (0.20) 15.84 (1.84) 4.384 (0.098) 18391 (531) 0.6191 (0.0068)
η= 0.3 5.02 (0.29) 25.2 (2.3) 4.36 (0.13) 17974 (590) 0.6127 (0.0074)
η= 0.4 6.51 (0.32) 30.0 (2.1) 4.34 (0.11) 17997 (567) 0.6043 (0.0097)
η= 0.5 6.76 (0.46) 35.2 (1.3) 4.040 (0.072) 16499 (297) 0.6152 (0.0047)
Table 2.6: For each variable and scenario considered, the table shows ensemble average (and
related standard error in brackets) of time averages distributions over a twenty-years-long
time period. The variables reported are: CGPs employment level (%), DADs employment
level (%), KGP employment level (%) and total capital stock owned by CGPs. The analysis
takes into account six different values of η and the case characterized by the absence of
intangible investments.
CGPs empl. (%) DADs empl. (%) KGP empl. (%)
CGPs total
capital stock
No Int Inv 52.16 (0.31) 0 (0) 24.79 (0.44) 117346 (1407)
η= 0.05 44.31 (0.92) 16.42 (0.76) 17.18 (0.41) 95691 (925)
η= 0.1 39.1 (1.2) 17.89 (0.87) 18.42 (0.34) 99209 (816)
η= 0.2 27.5 (1.4) 21.37 (0.93) 14.99 (0.56) 92094 (1252)
η= 0.3 22.31 (0.92) 19.4 (1.2) 12.77 (0.53) 87821 (1705)
η= 0.4 20.18 (0.77) 18.03 (0.93) 11.51 (0.61) 84920 (1941)
η= 0.5 18.64 (0.48) 15.29 (0.73) 10.59 (0.36) 81568 (1345)
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represented in the model by consumption good producers (CGPs)5. However, for η = 0.1 the
unemployment level is not extremely high and does not assume critical value.
Obviously, as mentioned above, the unemployment trend reflects the technological
progress within the economy. In this regard, Fig. 2.8 shows a significant increase of the
average TFP γ f for high values of η . This increase determine a collapse of the economic
system.
Furthermore, Fig. 2.8 shows that in the long-term the average TFP γ f is higher for η =
0.4 compared to η = 0.5; this fact witnesses a decrease of R&D activities related to a very
high endogenous rate of technological change which determines in the long-term a lower
capital level and in turn lower revenues in the DADs sector for η = 0.5. Indeed, the average
productivity level is higher in this case until the 19th year, than the curve flattens. This fact
highlights the complexity characterizing the digital economy in which the various industrial
sectors are interrelated with each other.



























Figure 2.7: For η = 0.01; 0.2; 0.5 and the no intangible investments case, the figure displays
for each year the average across 20 seeds (with the related standard error) of the yearly
means of the unemployment level.
It results to be difficult to imagine a future characterized by such high unemployment
levels. However, since we do not have a perfect ability to foresee the future, considering high
values of η gives us a complete overview of the long-term possible scenarios even if they
seem to be unrealistic or catastrophic. Moreover, testing a large range of values gives us the
possibility to verify the functioning and validity of my model.
5For the sake of clarity, I did not include in Fig. 2.7 all the scenarios considered converning the “competitive
pricing" case. However, Table 2.5 completes the analysis adding information related to the missing scenarios.
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Figure 2.8: For each scenario (i.e., value of η considered), the figure displays for each year
the average across 20 seeds (with the related standard error) of the yearly means of the
average productivity or TFP of digital assets.
These strong negative effects on the economy are partly related to the lack of other
compensation mechanisms, as for example the introduction of new products in the market.
In this respect, the compensation mechanism “via new products" represents one of the
most effective counterbalancing effects to process innovation. In fact, literature highlights
a positive relationship between product innovation and employment, see Pianta (2009).
However, being the consumption goods homogeneous, this type of compensation mechanism
can not be modelled in Eurace at the current state.
It is worth noting that not all the compensation mechanisms can coexist together and can
be captured by a model at the same time. For example, the compensation mechanism “via
increase in incomes" is in clear contrast with the "via decrease in wages" one, as highlighted
by Vivarelli (2014).
Obviously, all these results are strictly linked to the modelling assumption influenced
by the empirical analysis: the total factor augmenting technological progress. As explained
above, the positive and significant correlations between TFP - ICT&Soft&DB and TFP -
R&D has leaded me to assume a positive effect of these investments on the TFP. Therefore,
in Eurace technological progress affects input factors, namely capital and labour, increasing
their marginal productivity in the same proportion.
Chapter 3
Modelling the Digital Transformation:
the Elasticity Augmenting Approach
3.1 The elasticity augmenting framework: a short intro-
duction
In this chapter, in order to analyze long-term consequences linked to a digital transformation,
I have proposed an alternative production function based on the notion of organizational
unit which combines both the concept of substitutability and complementarity. This new
conceptual production technology is integrated within the large-scale macroeconomic model
Eurace. In particular, I build on the latest version of the Eurace model presented in Chapter 2
and in Bertani et al. (2020a,b), which encompasses intangible digital technologies, replacing
the Cobb-Douglas technology, used to model the manufacturing processes in a traditional
mass-production system, with a Leontief production function in which input factors are
represented by organizational units. In turn, the contribution of each organization unit is
given by a combination between labour and capital. Furthermore, in this new framework,
technological progress does not affect total factor productivity directly, but the nature of
technology itself: innovation affects the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour.
In other words, I propose a new alternative approach that I call elasticity-augmenting approach
according to which digital technological progress increases the degree of substitutability
between workforce and machines.
Through the new production function based on organizational units it is possible to
represent the overall production process of firms in a more realistic way distinguishing
between the various activities performed in the companies and the different education levels
characterizing the workforce employed. Furthermore, the elasticity-augmenting approach
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represents a new consistent way to represent the technological progress, as it will be shown
in the next sections. For instance, it can be considered as a valid and similar alternative to the
task-based approach, especially for those models in which tasks performed by households
are not heterogeneous: an increase of the elasticity of substitution can be seen as an increase
in the tasks that machines can performed replacing human beings, in line with what really
happened in the history of technological evolution.
Except for the features described in the next sections, the second framework of the Eurace
model presents the same modelling assumption described in the previous chapter. Moreover,
the research contribution exposed below has been reported in Bertani et al. (2021).
3.2 The new production technology
Companies tend to organize their structure into organizational units (OUs) in order to improve
their economic performance. In particular, this organization allows to decrease costs and
increase productivity. An OU is represented by a group of workers which is organized
according to a specific criterion1 and it is run by a manager.
Therefore, the production of a company is given by the interaction between complemen-
tary OUs and firm complexity is given by the number of units: the higher the number of OUs,
the higher the company complexity as the number of necessary interactions increases. Being
OUs not substitutable2, a Leontief production technology can represent the macro production
within a generic firm composed by n OUs:
Y = min[γ1YOU1,γ2YOU2, .....,γnYOUn ] (3.1)
where YOUi represents the contribution provided by the i-th OU to Y and γi is the coefficient
of production of the OU considered. Each OU takes part in the production process requiring
inputs, namely different kinds of “hard" capital Ki and workers Li, and its contribution in
productive term can be improved, for example through technological innovation.
The debate among economists on the value of ES between K and L is still open, see
Arrow et al. (1961); Douglas (1976); Gechert et al. (2019); Kalt (1978); Mućk (2017); Piketty
and Goldhammer (2014). However, regardless of the substitutability grade between K and L,
1We can distinguish between two general criteria to group positions in order to create an OU at the first
hierarchical level, namely the functional and the divisional one, see Mintzberg (1979). According to the former,
human resources are grouped by knowledge, skill, work process or work function, whereas the divisionalized
form is based on market grouping.
2The reasoning behind this logic assumption is linked to the irreplaceable nature of OUs tasks: the function
performed by the human resources OU can not be performed by the manufacturing or R&D unit. This is why
OUs are considered complementary.
3.2 The new production technology 49
it is possible to represent the contribution YOUi of the i-th OU through a constant ES (CES)







where αi is the distribution parameter and ρi represents the substitution parameter and it is a





The coefficient of production γi results to be crucial because it defines the optimal contribution
of the specific organizational unit in order to produce a certain amount of goods Ŷ . In this
regard, the optimal contribution ŶOUi of each organizational unit OUi is given by the ratio





After determining the quantity of consumption goods to be produced Ỹ and then the
optimal contribution of each organizational unit OUi, a potential way to define the optimal
demands of input factors inside the different OUi, i.e. K̂i and L̂i, is represented by the
mathematical optimization methods of Lagrange multipliers. In this respect, the following
relation represents the Lagrangian function used for the calculation of these input factors in
each organizational units OUi in Eurace:










where C(Li,Ki) represents the cost function to be minimized and g(Li,Ki) is the production
technology constraint. Moreover, wOUi represents the average cost of labour or mean wage
3,
ri and cKi are the rental rate proxied by the corporate loan rate and the unit cost of the “hard"
capital, respectively. Multiplying Ki, which represents the physical stock of “hard" capital,
by cKi we obtain its monetary value. In this way, I can evaluate the rental cost of the capital
stock Ki multiplying it by ri.
Starting from L (Li,Ki,Λ), the Lagrange multipliers methods leads CGPs to formulate
the demands of production factors reported below for each OU . As regards the optimal
3For the sake of simplicity, firms consider the average wage paid to their employees working in that specific
organizational unit wOUi as the labour cost. In fact, households differ in education level and each of these refers
to a different wage. Therefore, the mean wage of the organizational unit OUi represents an appropriate measure
of the labour cost which is, in fact, heterogeneous.
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3.2.1 Integrating the new production technology in the Eurace model
For the sake of simplicity, each CGP is organized according to a functional structure with
two complementary OUs grouped by skills and knowledge.
The first unit OU1 is representative of the manufacturing process inside the company
and it only includes undergraduate workers characterized by a low educational level. In
order to produce consumption goods, this OU is endowed with “hard" capital represented by
machine tools, robots and automated machines that can be improved through the integration
of technologically advanced digital assets. High-skilled workers characterized by a high
education level are grouped in a second unit OU2 performing all the intellectual tasks, e.g.
engineering, human resources and marketing. It has been assumed that graduate workers do
not need machines in order to work. Therefore, I do not consider the presence of capital,
both tangible and intangible, within OU2, focusing our technological progress study on the
pure manufacturing process.
According to our modelling assumption, CGPs production technology are represented by
the following function:
Y = min[γ1YOU1,γ2YOU2] = min
{
γ1[αK−ρd +(1−α)L−ρdu ]−1/ρd ,γ2Lg
}
(3.8)
where Lu and Lg represent undergraduate and graduate work force respectively.
This distinction between graduate and undergraduate workforce implies a more specific
labour demand compared to the previous Eurace versions. Indeed, CGPs no longer require
indiscriminate workforce but, on the contrary, they evaluate both the graduate and under-
graduate workers needed in order to reach the production target and try to hire them in the
proportion imposed by the production technology. It is also worth noting that a potential
lack of graduate workers can not be compensated by undergraduates and consequently this
determines a production reduction.
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As mentioned above, technological progress affects ES σd modifying the isoquant curve
and redefining the optimal demand of production factors4, i.e capital K and labour Lu, within
OU1. In particular, a successful R&D activity performed by the reference DAD d is followed
by an update of the digital technology adopted by the CGP and the value of σd between K
and LK into OU1 increases by a fixed tick equal to δσ following the relation below:
σdt = σdt−1 +δσ (3.9)
Being ρd a transform of σd , technological transition affects its value according to the





Alternatively, the firm can increase the ES σd by adopting more technologically advanced
digital assets. In this respect, each CGP can adopt only one kind of intangible digital asset at
a time, namely its digital assets in use are supplied by only one DAD. On a monthly basis,
it has a given exogenous probability to change its reference DAD. In order to evaluate a
potential switching, the CGP performs a costs and benefits analysis through the computing
of a net present value for each alternative digital technologies:
NPV =
[








where asterisks point out variables referring to the new digital technologies under financial
evaluation and hats indicate optimal quantities of production factors. Moreover, cK is the
hard capital unit cost, r represents the rental rate of capital proxied by the corporate loan
rate and w is the average wage within the OU1. The NPV first term refers to the production
cost saving linked to the use of the new digital technology. In fact, if the elasticity of
substitution of the new technologies is different, the optimal quantities of labour L̂u and
capital K̂ change determining different optimal costs. As concerning NPV second term, it
refers to the difference between the licence unit price pl of the digital technology currently
in adoption and the one under consideration p∗l . These two prices are multiplied by the
two optimal quantities of capital related to elasticities of substitution of the different digital
technologies. The third and final term takes into account the training costs that the firm would
face to train its employees to manage the new digital technology: cd is the training cost per
workers whereas NLu represents the number of employees that are not able to manage the
new digital technology under financial evaluation.
4The optimal demand of K and Lu is determined considering both the input factor variable in the short-term.
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In this regard, as explained in the previous chapter, HHs have been endowed with a set of
digital technology skills that represent their ability to manage the various digital assets on
the market. If a worker does not have the required skill or, in other words, he is not able to
use the digital asset adopted, he must be trained to take part to the production process; these
training courses are provided by DADs. Therefore, this is why the training costs are taken
into account in the costs and benefits analysis: if a company decides to change digital asset,
it must evaluate also potential costs associated to workers training. From a certain point of
view, these expenditures can be considered as intangible investments in formation: firms
enhance their human resources paying for their “digital education".
The presence of this set of digital technology allows us to model an indirect network
effect according to which economic benefits arise indirectly from the interaction of different
groups (Belleflamme and Peitz (2018); Farrell and Klemperer (2007)). In fact, both CGPs
and DADs can benefit from these digital skills. As regards CGPs, the higher the number
of workers with that skill, the lower the transition costs to the digital technology under
evaluation, while regarding DADs, the higher the number of workers able to manage their
digital assets, the higher the probability to sell their technology.
Obviously, CGPs could also face training costs following a hiring session. This is why,
in this second framework, CGPs hire workers prioritizing those able to manage the digital
technology adopted in that specific moment.
3.3 Computational results
3.3.1 Design of experiments
In order to evaluate the potential consequences related to digital technological progress on
the economic system, I investigate the Eurace model with four different level of η , namely
the shape parameter of the innovation probability function presented in the previous chapter
(see Eq. 2.1 in Chapter 2). The parameter η results to be crucial because it influences
the endogenous rate of technological progress within economy. Indeed, as mentioned in
the previous chapter, the higher the value of η , the higher the probability of developing
an improved version of the digital asset. Furthermore, I consider also a “no intangible
investments" scenario in which intangible investments and technological progress do not
exist, for a total of five scenarios.
The methodology of this research is based on Monte Carlo computational experiments:
each scenario is simulated with twenty different seeds of the pseudorandom number generator.
Therefore, a total number of 100 simulations is considered to conduct the analysis. According
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to the study methodology, most of results are presented in the form of boxplots. Each boxplot
represents the distribution of time averages of relevant variables over a twenty-year-long time
period, including the twenty simulations characterised by different seeds. In particular, boxes
enclose values from the first to the third quartile. The horizontal segments within boxes
represent the median, while the green diamond is the mean value of the distribution. Boxes
include also whiskers representing the minimum and maximum values of the distributions
which are not considered outliers. The latter are represented by red plus signs.
In order to give a complete overview of our model, I present also yearly averages across
20 seeds (with the related standard error) and several time series related to the most important
variables of interest, so I can show the trend of the system during the entire twenty-year-long
simulation; all time series considered refer to a specific seed.
3.3.2 The dynamics of the system: a macroeconomic perspective
Fig. 3.1 (a) shows an increase with η of the average elasticity of substitution σ between input
factors in the manufacturing organizational unit OU1. In fact, high values of η determine
high rates of endogenous technological progress and consequently high value of σ . In this
respect, the higher the technological progress level, the wider the range of tasks that can be
performed by the “hard" capital on which technologically advanced digital technologies are
installed. According to Eq. 3.6 and 3.7, different values of ρ , which is a transform of σ ,
imply different optimum quantities of input factors. The latter are determined considering
respective costs of inputs in order to increase the economic efficiency of the manufacturing
process and the adoption of capital appears cheaper compared to human beings. Therefore,
higher values of the elasticity σ determine a substitution of labour with capital in the CGPs
industrial sector. The process innovation within CGPs turns out to be detrimental for workers
that are replaced by technologically advanced machines. As a matter of fact, Fig. 3.1 (b)
and (c) show a decrease in the employment level and an increase of the total stock of capital
within CGPs with η , respectively. Therefore, the higher the digital technological progress
(which is strictly influenced by η), the lower the employment level within CGPs.
It is worth highlighting that this substitution of labour with capital determines an increase
in the labour productivity PL in the CGPs, which is calculated through the ratio between
CGPs output, i.e. the sold quantity of consumption goods in terms of units, and number of
workers employed, see Fig. 3.1 (d).
The substitution between labour and capital results in an increase of the general unem-
ployment rate, see Fig. 3.2 (a): the economic system is not able to absorb the job destruction
(or displacement effect) caused by digital technologies within CGPs. However, Eurace is
able to capture two different compensation mechanisms that counteract this technological
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Figure 3.1: The figure shows a series of boxplots representing, for any scenario considered,
the distribution of: the average elasticity of substitution σ characterizing the economy (a), the
employment level within CGPs (b), the total units of capital (c), the labour productivity within
CGPs (d). Each boxplot reports the distribution of the time averages over a twenty-year time
period for each one of the twenty seeds considered.
unemployment, namely the compensation mechanism “via decrease in price" and “via addi-
tional employment in the capital good sector". The innovation process within manufacturing
organizational unit OU1 allows CGPs to save money linked to replaced workforce. This cost
reduction leads to a unit price decrease as it is visible in Fig. 3.2 (b): high values of η and
high level of technological progress determine low price levels. In turn, this price decrease
determines an increase in the real sales of consumption goods, see Fig. 3.2 (c). Obviously,
lower consumption good price levels are related to higher real average wage, see Fig. 3.2 (d).
Fig. 3.3 shows the trend of the consumption goods (CGs) prices level over time. In the
case without tangible investments prices increases over time, whereas for η = 0.1; 0.2 and
0.3 prices tend to decrease in the long term reflecting technological progress and this trend is
the representation of the compensation mechanism “via decrease in price" cited above. In the
case characterized by η = 0.05, although the CGs price level is lower compared to the case
without intangible investments, it continues to growth with a lower rate: the technological
progress determines a slowdown of CGs price level growth instead of a decrease.
Fig. 3.4 (a) shows that the unemployment level increases over time in every scenario
considered except for the “No Intangible Investments" case in which it remains constant. It
is worth highlighting that for the first ten years, the unemployment levels are quite similar
in all the scenarios and acceptable. In particular, for η = 0.05 and 0.1 the percentage of
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Figure 3.2: The figure shows a series of boxplots representing, for any scenario, the dis-
tribution of: the unemployment level (a), the consumption goods price level (b), the real
sales of consumption goods (CGs) (c), the real average wage (d). Each boxplot reports the
distribution of the time averages over a twenty-year time period for each one of the twenty
seeds considered.
unemployment is equal to the case characterized by the absence of intangible investments.
After the first ten years the trajectories tend to separate and this separation intensifies over
time.
Obviously, the unemployment trends are strictly related to the technological progress
within the economic system. Fig 3.4 (b) shows the average elasticity of substitution σ
characterizing the economy. In the “No Intangible Investments" case it remains constant,
whereas in the other cases it increases during the time. In the first ten years, the values
assumed by σ do not involve mass unemployment because the system is able to counteract
quite effectively the job destruction within the CGPs industrial sector also for high values of
η (namely 0.2 and 0.3). After ten years, σ assumes values significantly higher than one for
high values of η and this fact leads to critical levels of unemployment at the end of the period.
In this scenarios, the compensation mechanisms are not capable to counteract innovation
process within CGPs. In fact, Fig. 3.4 (c) and (d) show a decrease in the CGPs employment
and an increase of their capital endowment, respectively. In other words, machines replace
human beings in the jobs that they used to perform within CGPs and this tendency is amplified
as technological progress increases. The unemployment level remains acceptable in the
long term only for η = 0.05. Indeed, it remains quite constant as in the case without digital
technological progress.
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Figure 3.3: For each scenario considered, the figure displays for each year the mean across
20 seeds (with the related standard error) of the yearly time averages of the CGs price level.
Fig. 3.5 (a) and (b) show the increase of the labour productivity PL and the decrease of
the capital productivity PK over time. The former reflects the unemployment trend displayed
by Fig. 3.4 (a) and the latter reflects the evolution of the stock of capital within the system
shown by Fig. 3.4 (d). In particular, as regards PL, it remains constant in the case without
digital investments whereas in the other ones it increases over time proportionally to the
technological progress itself. As far as PK is concerned, after a transitory phase in which
trajectories are almost the same, it decreases over time proportionally to the technological
progress.
The massive unemployment affects also CGPs sales: beyond a certain limit, technological
progress turns out to be a double-edged sword. As a matter of fact, while CGs real sales
increases over time for η = 0.05; 0.1; 0.2, for η = 0.3 they reach a plateau after the fourteenth
year. In this regard, it is worth noting that, after fourteen years the stock of capital decreases
for η = 0.3 , see Fig. 3.4 (d). Although there is a decrease in the CGPs capital endowment,
the sales are stable in the long term, as just noted. This fact is linked to an increase of
the market concentration, see Fig. 3.5 (d). As a matter of fact, for η = 0.3, the market
concentration increases over time in a significant way. Therefore, firms that experience a
reduction of their sales stop to invest in machines and the depreciation process determines
a decrease in their capital endowment. At the same time, firms that experience an increase
of market share tend to maintain or increase their capital stock. Even in the case without
intangible investments, the market concentration doubles, causing the emergence of a group
of larger companies on the market. However, the technological progress amplifies market
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concentration: the first firms that adopt technologically advanced digital assets are able to
manufacture their products with lower costs acquiring higher market shares. In other words,
process innovation helps firm to be more competitive and increase their revenues.



























































































Figure 3.4: For each scenario considered, the figure displays for each year the mean across
20 seeds (with the related standard error) of the yearly time averages of: the unemployment
level(%) (a), the average elasticity of substitution ES σ (b), the number of workers within
CGPs (c) and the stock of capital (d).
As far as the compensation mechanism “via additional employment in the capital good
sector" is concerned, it is related to the increase of employment in the capital good sector. In
fact, the substitution of the workforce with capital determines a higher demand of capital,
both “hard" and digital, which increases with η . As mentioned above, the two kinds of
capital are complementary: each unit of “hard" capital is associated with a digital asset
license. Therefore, the employment level within DADs and the KGP increases with η , see
Fig. 3.6 (a) and (b).
The two compensation mechanisms are not able to counterbalance effectively the techno-
logical unemployment caused by technologically advanced digital assets in the CGPs. This
is why the system experiences high levels of unemployment for high values of η .
It is worth noting that other compensation mechanisms do not emerge or do not have
been modelled in Eurace, e.g. the “via new products" one. This fact may have influenced the
unemployment levels displayed by the model, making them higher compared to the potential
levels achievable in case of high technological progress. However, the coexistence of all the
compensation mechanisms is not possible. For instance, the compensation mechanism “via
increase in incomes" is not compatible with the “via decrease in wages" one, as reported by
Vivarelli (2014).
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Figure 3.5: For each scenario considered, the figure displays for each year the mean across 20
seeds (with the related standard error) of the yearly time averages of: the labour productivity
PL (a), the capital productivity PK (b), the CGs real sales (c) and the stock of capital (d).
The increase of the capital stock in production processes determines a decrease of the
capital productivity PK , which is defined through the ratio between the CGPs output and
the capital endowment, see Fig. 3.6 (c). In this Eurace framework, technological progress
does not affect the total factor productivity as in Bertani et al. (2020a,b), but it influences
the elasticity of substitution σ . Therefore, technological progress allows CGPs to produce
the same amount of output using a different optimal combination of production factors
characterized by a reduction of the most expensive input and an increase in the cheapest one.
In this regard, it is worth highlighting that a decrease in the adoption of an input is always
compensated by an increase in the other one. Since capital is the least expensive, CGPs tend
to adopt more capital in the production process instead of workers5. This is why the capital
productivity PK decreases with η . Empirical evidences show that PK has been decreasing in
most of OECD countries for the past twenty years. On the contrary, even if faintly, the labour
productivity has been growing for the past twenty years in OECD countries, see OECD
(2019).
According to our model, besides decreasing costs of using capital, a potential explanation
of this phenomenon could be found in an increase of the elasticity of substitution σ . In fact,
5It is worth noting that an increase of the elasticity of substitution σ could also determined exactly the
opposite, namely an increase in the number of workers and a decrease in the stock of capital. However, the use
of capital turns out to be less expensive compared to the workforce and the optimization leads to an increase in
the capital endowment. In fact, for any value of the elasticity of substitution, the cost of the capital required to
produce a unit of consumption good tend to be lower compared to the labour one.
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the model shows that an increase of σ leads to an increase of PL and a decrease of PK . From
a financial perspective, it is logic to adopt to a large extent (or completely) the cheapest input
factors in the production process. However, there must be also the technological possibility
to do this: input factors must be replaceable in a high range of tasks. Therefore, the adoption
of an input factors is not only determined by the costs, but it depends also on technology.
Although the level of unemployment increases with η , the economy experiences also
high values of real GDP for high values of η , see Fig. 3.6 (d). Obviously, these high real
GDP levels are linked to low prices and also to the Government which ensures a welfare
system through fiscal policy that guarantees an economic subsidy to unemployed households.
This subsidy allows unemployed to perform a basic subsistence consumption.















































Figure 3.6: The figure shows a series of boxplots representing, for any scenario considered,
the distribution of: the employment level within DADs (a), the employment level within KGP
(b), the capital productivity PK (c), the real GDP (d). Each boxplot reports the distribution of
the time averages over a twenty-year time period for each one of the twenty seeds considered.
It is worth underlying the different employment levels related to the various education
degrees characterizing households. In fact, workers can be distinguished in five groups based
on their education levels. The various kinds of firms demand different types of workforce
according to the tasks that they have to perform and in order to develop and produce their
products: DADs hire only workers from the third up to perform R&D activities; CGPs
hire undergraduate workers (from the first to the third education level) to employ in the
manufacturing organizational unit OU1 and graduate workers (fourth and fifth education
level) in order to use them in the organizational unit OU2 in which the various intellectual
tasks are performed; KGP hire workers disregarding their education level to produce “hard"
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capital. According to our modelling assumptions, the digital technological progress affects
the manufacturing unit increasing the elasticity of substitution σ between labour and capital.
Therefore, workforce characterized by low education levels is directly influenced by process
innovation. For each value of η considered, Fig. 3.7 shows the trend of the employment levels
related to the various education degrees characterizing households. In the “No intangible
investment" case (see Fig. 3.7 (a)) for each education level the number of workers is constant
over time. As regards the other cases, workers with education level equal to 4 and 5 remain
constant over time, whereas those with an educational level equal to 1,2 and 3 decrease over
time and this fact reflects the technological progress within the economy. As a matter of fact,
as pointed out above, technological progress increases over time determining the replacement
of labour with capital within the manufacturing organization units and this tendency increases
with η .
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Figure 3.7: For each scenario considered, the figure displays several subplots representing for
each education level and for each year the mean across 20 seeds (with the related standard
error) of the yearly time averages of the number of workers within the economic system.
3.3.3 The competitive dynamics between DADs
In this subsection, I explore the competitive behaviour showed by DADs within digital
technologies market. It is worth highlighting that also the Eurace framework described in
Bertani et al. (2020a,b) presents the same business dynamics. As mentioned above, DADs
compete in order to increase their market share trying to improve their products and varying
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their license unit cost. In fact, according to Eq. 3.11, a higher value of σ (linked to a
successful R&D activity) or a lower price can determine the switch between digital assets.
Fig. 3.8 (a) shows the emergence of a market leader in the long term on the digital assets
market: a DAD acquires almost all of the digital technologies market. In other words, it
emerges one of the most important features related to the increasing returns world, namely
the winner-take-all phenomenon.
The emergence of a market leader results to be the consequences of an intense competition
between DADs. Fig. 3.8 (a) shows that the market shares of digital technologies producers
vary over time; they lose and gain market shares continuously before the ascent of a definitive
market leader, namely DAD1, which detains most of the digital market. Although other
DADs, i.e. DAD2 and DAD3, try to contrast the rise of DAD1 decreasing their prices and
giving also their licenses for free in certain periods, they are not able to recover their lost
market shares; the higher revenues deriving from the higher number of licenses sold allow
DAD1 to increase its R&D intensity and develop improved version of digital assets (see 3.8
(b)) and its competitors can not compensate the increasing technological gap with lower
prices, see 3.8 (c). In this regard, digital assets produced by DAD1 allow CGPs to replace
workers with capital in a wider range of tasks compared to the other digital technologies
on the market and this fact determines a significant cost reductions. In fact, DAD1 can also
increase significantly its license unit price once it has technologically surpassed other DADs.
Using other terms, these digital assets increase the production process efficiency allowing
to produce the same amount of goods using less financial resources. From this perspective,
the elasticity of substitution σ can be considered as an efficiency parameter as argued by
de La Grandville (1997).
3.3.4 Elasticity augmenting approach and total factor augmenting ap-
proach: a technological unemployment comparison
I present here a comparison between the total factor augmenting approach in Bertani et al.
(2020a,b) and the elasticity augmenting approach of this paper. It is worth noting that the two
Eurace versions under analysis are characterized by different production technologies. In the
total factor augmenting framework, the production processes of CGPs are modelled through
the constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function which has always been used
in the Eurace research works. In this new research, I adopt a Leontief production function
based on the concept of organizational units. Therefore, being production technologies
different, a punctual analysis showing differences between each variables results to be not
significant and effective.
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Figure 3.8: The figure displays various time series in case of η = 0.2; in particular it shows:
number of users (a), Elasticity of substitution ES σ (b) and license unit cost (e) (c) of the
three different digital assets developers. All time series refer to a specific replication which
is representative of the system average trend in case of η = 0.2.
One sensible comparison can concern the technological unemployment within the eco-
nomic system. Fig. 3.9 shows that for low values of η (to which low technological progress
rates correspond) the unemployment level within the economy are similar. At the same time
for high values of η the unemployment level is significantly higher in the total factor aug-
menting framework. This difference is strictly linked to the compensation mechanism “via
additional employment in the capital goods sector". In the total factor augmenting version,
digital technological progress influences in the same way capital and labour, determining
a decrease of both input factor demands. On the other hand, in the elasticity augmenting
framework, digital technological progress affects the elasticity of substitution between labour
and capital. This leads to a replacement of labour with capital. Therefore, the compensation
mechanism “via additional employment in the capital goods sector" is more effective because
it works not only in the DADs industrial sector but also in the KGP.
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Figure 3.9: The figure shows a series of boxplots representing, for any scenario and Eurace
version considered, the distribution of the unemployment level (%). Each boxplot reports the
distribution of the time averages over a twenty-year time period for each one of the twenty
seeds considered.
Conclusion
A synthesis of the research work and main findings
The main purpose of this research is to provide a scientific contribution to the open debate
concerning the potential consequences of the digital technological progress.
First, I performed an empirical analysis taking into account various European countries
and USA data in order to asses the relation between productivity and different kinds of
tangible and intangible investments. This analysis shows a high positive and significant
correlation between total factor productivity and two key investment typologies: the sum
between tangible ICT equipment, software and database investments, and R&D investments.
According to these main empirical findings, I have modelled a new framework of the
Eurace agent-based model that includes new intangible digital investment assets as well as
new agents in charge of their development, say digital assets developers (DADs). By virtue of
the complementarity between hardware and software, consumption goods producers (CGPs)
install these digital technologies within “hard" capital in order to increase their total factor
productivity.
DADs invest a fixed fraction of their revenues in R&D activities that have a likelihood to
bring to light a smarter version of the digital asset with an increased impact on the total factor
productivity of its users, i.e. the CGPs. R&D activities performed by DADs then lead to an
innovation process inside the economic system, whose speed, that I control through an ex-
ogenous parameter, turns out to be crucial in order to understand the potential implications of
intangible digital technology adoption on the economy and the labour market. In this respect,
I observe that in case of a moderate rate of innovation, compensation mechanisms (“via
decrease in price" and via “additional employment in the capital goods sector") counteract the
displacement effect caused by digital technologies in the traditional mass production system
represented by consumption goods producers. Conversely, for high rate of technological
progress, the unemployment increases dramatically. Furthermore, the increasing employment
level within DADs in case of higher rates of technological progress highlights a clear labour
market transformation: the economic system experiences a transition from a mass production
economy to a digital services one.
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In the third and final phase of my research, starting from the concept of organizational unit,
I have implemented a new production function which replaces the Cobb-Douglas technology
used in the total factor augmenting framework. In particular, this production technology is
represented by a Leontief function in which the input factors are organizational units. In
turn, the contribution of these units is given by the combination between labour and capital
or only by labour. In order to evaluate the potential consequences of digital technological
progress on the economy, I have proposed an alternative approach, namely the elasticity
augmenting approach. According to this modelling assumption, the technological progress
affects the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour within the manufacturing
process; as in the total factor augmenting framework, the engine of the technological progress
is represented by the DADs. Through this approach, I want to represent the evolution of
digital technologies over time which are able to replace human beings in an ever wider set of
tasks.
Similarly to the first framework developed, the elasticity augmenting one shows the
significant influence that digital technological progress has on the labour market. Also in
this case, high rates of technological progress could lead to a long term mass technological
unemployment: compensation mechanisms captured by Eurace are not able to counteract
effectively the replacement of human workers with technologically advanced machines.
Comparing the elasticity augmenting approach with the total factor augmenting one,
the former results to be more realistic because it is able to capture a decreasing capital
productivity and an increasing labour productivity in line with what it is experienced by the
economy. By influencing the elasticity of substitution, the technological progress determines
a replacement of labour with machines, whereas, in a total factor augmenting framework, it
determines a decrease of the demand of both production factors.
The research work has highlighted the growing importance of intangible digital invest-
ments in the economy. Although both approaches lead to critical unemployment levels for
high rates of technological progress, in case of low or intermediate rates, the economy does
not experience negative long-term consequences. Therefore, according to the Eurace model,
experienceable future scenarios will depend on the rate of technological progress.
Limitations
It is worth highlighting that results are also influenced by the absence of specific policies, e.g.
a robot tax, aimed at reducing and counteracting the technological unemployment caused by
digital assets. Besides a robot tax, an excessive displacement effect could also be countered
through a reform of the education system in order to train the future generations of “digital
workers", thus helping the match between supply and demand on the evolving labour market.
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Moreover, results are also influenced by the absence of other compensation mechanisms,
as for example the product innovation. In particular, the latter could provide a relevant
contribution of new jobs related to the opening of new markets. The co-presence of all
mechanisms highlighted by compensation theory nevertheless turns out to be impossible
because, in some cases, they are not compatible.
In the total factor augmenting framework, the massive unemployment is also related
to the exponential shape of the total factor productivity growth. Through this modelling
assumption, the impact of digital technological progress turns out to be significant on the
labour market. However, it is worth noting that empirical data suggests long term exponential
growth of total factor productivity.
Direction for further research
I will focus my future research on the role of Government in the digital transformation, trying
to find effective policy mixes aimed at contrasting displacement effect and, at the same time,
fostering technological progress. Indeed, besides organizational improvements, technological
progress represents the only effective stimulus that can guarantee an economic growth for
our system. For this reason, it should not be hindered.
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